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RETHINKING THE “GOOD CAUSE”
REQUIREMENT: A NEW FEDERAL APPROACH
TO GRANTING PROTECTIVE ORDERS UNDER
F.R.C.P. 26(c)
I. INTRODUCTION
“Think Big Technologies” is the leading and only source of cameras
for “AMAX” films.1 “AMAX” films are surround-vision films which are
shown in theaters and immerse the viewer in the experience depicted by
the film. For example, one recent film titled “Glass Barrel Ride” depicted
a plunge over the Niagara waterfalls in a glass barrel.
Think Big’s cameras accomplish this effect by using a unique
photographic method. Since 1963, Think Big has developed and sold
equipment to display its films. It also operates theaters around the
world. It has never, however, sold equipment to make the surround
vision films, and no other competitor has entered the market.
Think Big contracted with Cokesi Company to supply caffeinated
soda beverages for all of its theaters’ snack-bars. Recently, a dispute
arose regarding the scope of the contract. Cokesi believes that Think Big
is bound to sell only Cokesi sodas, while Think Big asserts that the
contract is not exclusive and that it is free to also contract with Pepsoke,
Cokesi’s soda competitor.
During discovery, Cokesi requested information about the surroundvision cameras and film methods that Think Big utilizes to produce the
surround vision films. Think Big immediately requested a protective
order under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) to keep
discovery materials, particularly those involving its fundamental trade
secret—the surround-vision filming process—confidential. Accordingly,
Think Big enumerated a long list of “good cause” reasons to support the
protective order request. Cokesi did not contest the protective order
request, as it would also prefer to keep all discovery materials
confidential for the sake of efficiency.
As the judge considered the request, many questions came to mind.
She acknowledged that Think Big’s business information might
somehow be relevant to the litigation, but was that sufficient reason to
deny the protective order? She reasoned that it may be possible for
another company to get a business advantage by releasing Think Big’s
1

The facts in this introductory hypothetical are fictional.
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camera technology, but was that sufficient reason to grant a protective
order? She predicted that confidentiality may speed up the discovery
process, because the litigation involved large companies, but was that
sufficient reason to grant a protective order?
Looking to precedent, in her circuit and around other federal
circuits, the judge found very little, often inconsistent, guidance. Even
though some federal judges granted similar protective orders to protect
trade secrets, other circuits definitively prioritized public access over
confidentiality, making her unsure as to whether “good cause” existed in
this instance. This judge did not know what process to follow, what
information to consider, or what questions to ask.
As the preceding scenario demonstrates, the process by which
protective orders are granted in federal court is unclear, complex, and,
frankly, unpredictable. Think Big Technologies has an immense interest
in keeping its film-making process confidential, while Cokesi is invested
in getting as much information as possible about Think Big’s business
practices. Despite the high stakes for both litigating parties, the judicial
process for ascertaining “good cause” to grant protective orders under
F.R.C.P. 26(c) is not clear.2 On the federal level, the circuits have adopted
a variety of approaches which differ in the scope and treatment of trade
secrets.3 Some judges automatically grant uncontested protective orders,
others require a particularized showing of fact in order to satisfy “good
cause,” still others are adverse to confidentiality and refuse to grant
protective orders.4
Because the F.R.C.P. itself does not provide
guidelines for judges to consider when issuing protective orders, the
approaches vary significantly. As a result, when requesting a protective
order, the parties are not privy to what criteria each particular judge will
consider or to what constitutes “good cause.” This uncertainty may
inhibit attorneys from acting in accord with their fiduciary obligations,
because even if a protective order is in the clients’ best interests, it is
impossible to predict whether the litigation will yield the desired
confidentiality.5

See infra Part II.
Id.
4
See infra Part II.B.2.a.
5
See infra Part II.C.3. (discussing how the absence of a standard approach impedes
attorneys’ ability to act in their clients’ best interest and, also, how legislation aimed at
increasing public access divides attorneys’ fiduciary duty between their clients and the
public at-large).
2
3
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This Note explores the various federal circuit approaches for
determining “good cause” and granting protective orders, analyzes
shortcomings of the current, incomplete approaches, and proposes a
process for federal judges to follow when ascertaining whether a
protective order is proper. Part II of this Note explores and establishes
the basic components of protective orders, outlines the courts’ various
methods of determining whether “good cause” exists, and specifically
examines the Third Circuit’s approach.6 Part III analyzes the courts’
application of the Third Circuit’s “good cause” balancing test and asserts
that its narrow list of “good cause” balancing factors fails to account for
the broad range of grounds for protective orders, including trade
secrets.7 Part III, additionally, examines how the absence of a methodical
approach to granting protective orders undermines attorneys’ fiduciary
duties to act in their clients’ best interests.8 Finally, Part IV proposes the
“Good Cause Doctrine,” a procedural framework with distinct
guidelines, comporting with attorneys’ fiduciary duties, for federal
judges to follow when considering whether “good cause” exists to grant
a protective order under F.R.C.P. 26(c).9
II. BACKGROUND
Civil litigation is a system that involves secrecy.10 Protective orders,
the method by which judges protect the confidentiality of discovery
materials, create tension between individual litigants’ confidentiality
concerns and public access to the judicial system.11 Tracing the distinct
evolution of protective orders throughout American jurisprudence sheds
light on their function in discovery, as well as their direct effect on
individual privacy and public access to the judiciary.12
Part II examines the prevalence of confidentiality in discovery.13 By
specifically focusing on the development of discovery and protective
orders, Part II.A emphasizes that public access to the judiciary is not
absolute.14 Next, Part II.B assesses the components of protective orders,
identifies the F.R.C.P.’s “good cause” requirement, and outlines the
courts’ various methods of determining whether “good cause” exists to
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Parts II.A-B.
See infra Part II.A.
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warrant a protective order.15 Finally, Part II of this Note concludes by
categorizing state “sunshine in litigation” legislation that attempts to
maximize public access by limiting judicial discretion to grant protective
orders, and identifies how such a requirement interferes with attorneys’
fiduciary duty to serve their clients’ best interests.16
A. The Prevalence of Confidentiality in Discovery
[T]he most important office, and the one which all of us
can and should fill, is that of private citizen.17
1.

The American Discovery Revolution: A Historical Perspective

Confidentiality saturates the history of the American judicial
system.18 Based on concerns regarding intrusion into individuals’
private lives and confidential personal matters, Justices Louis D.
Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren submitted an article to the Harvard Law
Review at the end of the 19th century proposing that people are entitled

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
17
PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 66 (Schocken Books 2d
ed. 1989) (quoting Louis D. Brandeis).
18
HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW 197 (Ams Pr. Inc. 1953). The United
States has a highly-prized tradition of privacy. “The prevalence of concealment
mechanisms, employed through judicially-sanctioned private-party agreements to obscure
undesirable information from public scrutiny, is not a sudden development. Despite
indicia of widespread secrecy throughout the judicial system, the emergence of secrecy in
American litigation is more accurately depicted as a tortoise than a hare.” Albert Louis
Chollet III, Enabling the Gaze: Public Access and the Withdrawal of Tennessee’s Proposed Rule of
Civil Procedure 1A, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 695, 700 (2006). It is undisputed that “secrecy has
long been a part of the American legal system.” James V. Grimaldi, Hearsay: The Lawyer’s
Column; Recalls Spark Anti-Secrecy Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2000, at F35. At the turn of the
20th Century, William H. Moody, the U.S. Attorney General, recognized the acceptability
and expectability of secrecy by noting that the records from the Department of Commerce
and Labor “are executive documents acquired by the Government for the purpose of
administering its own affairs. . . and must therefore be classed as privileged
communications whose production can not be compelled by a court without the express
authority of a law of the United States.” 25 Op. Atty Gen. 326 (1905). The prevalence of
judicial secrecy continued throughout the mid-20th century as George G. Killenger wrote
in 1950: “In the future. . . desired information will be supplied if, in our opinion, such
information would be compatible with the welfare of society.” Letter from George G.
Killenger, Chair of the U.S. Board of Parole (Oct. 27, 1950), reprinted in HAROLD L. CROSS,
THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW 309 n.3 (Ams Pr. Inc. 1953). Historically, secrecy was clearly
the norm in the judiciary. The reality was that “in the absence of a general or specific act of
Congress creating a clear right to inspect—and such acts are not numerous—there is no
enforceable legal right in public or press to inspect any federal non-judicial record.”
HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW 197 (Ams Pr. Inc. 1953).
15
16
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to a legal right of privacy.19 Public awareness and attention toward the
prevalence of secrecy in judicial proceedings escalated a few decades
later, soon after the establishment and adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938.20

19
Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890). The notion of privacy is well-established in American legal theory. This article
provided, in part, that:
[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the
demands of society. . . [g]radually the scope of these legal rights
broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the right to
enjoy life, —the right to be let alone.
Id. at 193. The avant garde progress of the late 19th century heightened the need for a right
to personal privacy and “call[ed] attention to the next step which must be taken for the
protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the
right ‘to be let alone.’” Id. at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed.
1888)). But see United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1114 (3d Cir. 1985) (the privacy
interest is diminished if the litigant is a public figure generally subject to public scrutiny;
“the public has a substantial interest in the integrity or lack of integrity of those who serve
them in public office.”).
20
Thomas S. Blanton, U.S. Experience with Freedom of Information Law: Congressional
Activism, News Media Leadership, & Bureaucratic Politics, COMP. MEDIA L.J. 2 (2003). In the
1950’s, the American Society of Newspaper Editors retained Harold Cross to review
statutes restricting information access. Id. His findings “demonstrated that government at
every level was systematically denying access to information” and questioned the
distinction between government privacy and individual privacy. Id. Cross recognized the
suppression of information regarding judicial proceedings and noted that:
Under the impact of expansion of governmental activities, the number
and kinds of records withheld from public and press inspection have
enormously increased. Statutes are high in number and infinite in
variety; whenever legislators have convinced themselves . . . they have
passed statutes which run the gamut from that which may perhaps be
characterized as not ‘‘compatible with the public interest’’ to that
which appears to have no basis except the belief that it is ‘‘none of the
public’s business.’’ Some of these statutes impose mandatory secrecy.
Others provide for such limited inspection that it is highly probable
that courts would deny public or press inspection.
CROSS, supra note 18, at 84 (emphasis added). Cross calls for public recognition of judicial
secrecy by noting that:
public business is the public’s business. The people have a right to
know. Freedom of information about public records and proceedings is
their just heritage. Citizens must have the legal right to investigate
and examine the conduct of their affairs. They must have simple,
speedy means of enforcement.
Id. at 132 (emphasis added). Cross provides suggestions for what the press should do to
address the secrecy that exists in the judicial system: “in light of favorable trends and the
press record of successes, there seems to be no good reason why a newspaper should not
put its rights to the test in respect of any record of legitimate interest to the public, unless a
mandatory statute of clear import bars access.” Id. at 32-33. Cross’ position on the press’
right to judicial access revolves around the First Amendment, a basis which the Supreme
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Contemporary Access to Discovery: A Finite Right

First taking form in the mid-20th century, modern discovery
provides litigants access to information held by the other parties, but
does not compromise or eliminate individuals’ confidentiality interests.21
Discovery—”an integral part of litigation”—is not limitless, but instead
has definite boundaries.22 The United States Supreme Court clearly
renounced the presumption that public access to judicial records is
absolute in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.23 Six years later, the
Court subsequently invalidates. See infra notes 24-25, for a discussion of the Supreme
Court’s decision precluding the First Amendment as a means to circumvent protective
orders.
21
James E. Rooks, Jr., Let the Sun Shine In: ‘Sunshine’ Laws Do Not ‘Chill’ Settlements, Say
Advocates of Open Courts, 39 TRIAL 18 (June 2003). Professor Edson R. Sunderland is widely
attributed with developing the then-innovative American discovery principles. Edson R.
Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 865 (1933).
Sunderland’s ideas about discovery highlight the necessity of access to facilitate trial
preparation:
Is there any way of bridging this gap between what is set up in the
pleadings and what will come out in evidence? It is of course
important to know in advance the nature and extent of your
adversary’s claims. This knowledge is given by the pleadings. But it is
equally important, in preparing your proof, to know what proof your
adversary will be able to present in support of his claims and in
opposition to yours. This knowledge the pleadings does not give.
Id. His notions regarding expansive discovery were adopted by the Supreme Court in
1947:
No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘‘fishing expedition’’ serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his
opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
22
WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 33, 51 (1968).
In Hickman v. Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that access to information through
discovery has definite boundaries. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. In this case, respondents (tug
boat owners) employed counsel to defend them against potential suits resulting from the
sinking of a tug in which crew members drowned. Respondents’ attorney took statements
from the survivors with an eye toward litigation. During discovery, the petitioner
requested copies of written statements taken from the crew members, records, or other
memoranda made regarding the tug boat incident. Respondents refused to provide the
requested materials. On appeal, the Court found that petitioner’s request, made without
purported necessity or justification, fell outside of the arena of discovery. Discovery, “like
all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Id. at 507. Under the
auspices of Rule 26, “further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches
upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.” Id. at 508.
23
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). During the criminal trial of
several of the ex-President’s former advisors on charges in connection with the Watergate
investigation, portions of tape recordings were played in a public courtroom, and the reels
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United States Supreme Court rejected the notion of a constitutional right
to unlimited access to discovery in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart.24 Instead,
the Supreme Court specifically fettered public access to discovery,
holding that discovery materials “are not public components of a civil
trial.”25 Discovery was established to “avoid surprise at trial[,]” not to
“enlarge the public’s access to information.”26 Protective orders, one
of tapes were admitted into evidence. Id. at 589. Respondent reporters petitioned for
permission to copy, broadcast, and sell portions of the tapes played during the trial. Id.
The Court refused to grant access, holding that “the right to inspect and copy judicial
records is not absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files,
and access has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper
purposes.” Id. at 598. It is “well-settled that any policy or presumption favoring openness
in the judicial system is not absolute and may be limited when, in the discretion of the
court, it is necessary, to ensure the integrity, efficiency, and fairness of the judicial process.”
Chollet, supra note 18, at 705. Similarly, in Mercury News, a newspaper sought to gain
access to an investigation report commissioned by the City in connection with a sexual
harassment suit. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court- N.D. San Jose, 187 F.3d
1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). The court relied on the F.R.C.P. to find that the public had a
presumptive access to prejudgment civil court records. Id. This presumption for openness,
however, is easily overcome by the presence of “sufficiently important countervailing
interests” for confidentiality and secrecy. Id. at 1102.
24
Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). In Seattle Times, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the issue of whether parties in civil litigation have a right to disseminate, prior
to trial, information gained through pretrial discovery. The information in question
concerned the size and nature of a religious foundation’s membership, the names of its
donors, and the amounts of their donations. The Court approved the imposition of a
protective order and declared that a “litigant has no First Amendment right of access to
information made available only for purposes of trying his suit.” Id. at 32.
25
Id. at 33. The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not preclude court
control over discovery information, explaining that “pretrial depositions and
interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. Such proceedings were not open to
the public at common law. . . and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of
modern practice.” Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court noted that “much of the
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially
related, to the underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but
not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of
information.” Id. at 33. Additionally, the Court overruled In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), by concluding that an order prohibiting the dissemination of discovery materials
before a trial is not the type of classic prior restraint requiring First Amendment scrutiny.
Id. Based on Seattle Times, upon a showing of “good cause,” public access to discovery may
be limited. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33.
26
Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105
HARV. L. REV. 427, 447 (1991). The public’s right of access to court proceedings has “never
been extended beyond the confines of the courtroom and court documents.” Id. at 429. See,
e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 396 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“During
the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enormously expanded, it has
never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, that a pretrial deposition or pretrial
interrogatories were other than wholly private to the litigants.”); Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at
34 (declaring that “[l]iberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the
preparation and trial, or the settlement, of the litigated disputes.”) (emphasis added).
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method of preserving confidentiality, limit and shield sensitive discovery
information.27
B. Protective Orders: Protecting Privacy in the Pursuit of Justice
I would rather be exposed to the inconveniences attending too
much liberty than those attending too small a degree of it.28
1.

Defining Protective Orders

Protective orders, as defined by F.R.C.P. 26(c), further courts’ control
over the discovery process and materials.29 There are two different
Alan B. Morrison, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs, Defendants and the Public Interest in
Disclosure; Where does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 109, 111 (1989). Protective orders
prohibit the dissemination of discovery, “except to a few narrow categories of people,”
which, depending on the particular circumstances, may include “other lawyers in the
plaintiff’s attorney’s office, the plaintiff herself, expert witnesses, and perhaps a few others
provided they sign a confidentiality agreement under which they would not divulge any of
the information without permission from the court or the defendant.” Id. But see Gambale
v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2004) (the “bright light cast upon the
judicial process by public observation diminishes the possibilities for injustice,
incompetence, perjury, and fraud. Furthermore, the very openness of the process should
provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system and a better
perception of its fairness.”).
28
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Archibald Stuard, a
Congressional Representative from Virginia (Dec. 23, 1791), reprinted in THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, vol. 22 at 436 (Julian P. Boyd, et al. eds., 1950).
29
Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outline protective
orders as follows:
c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other
affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action,
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or
alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including
one or more of the following:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had;
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on
specified terms and conditions, including a designation of
the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking
discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope
of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except
persons designated by the court;
27
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approaches to protection for discovery materials: (1) particularized
protective orders or (2) “umbrella” protective orders.30
Particularized protective orders protect sensitive discovery materials
individually, on a document-by-document basis.31 In these instances, the
burden to prove “good cause” and justify confidentiality falls on the
party seeking the particularized protective order.32
On the other hand, umbrella protective orders designate all
discovery documents as presumptively protected, unless a party
challenges the confidentiality of a particular document.33 This guarantee
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by
order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information not be revealed or
be revealed only in a designated way; and
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents
or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as
directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the
court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any
party or other person provide or permit discovery. . .
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (2007) (emphasis added).
30
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §11.432 (2004).
31
Id. Proponents of narrow, particularized protective orders assert that “[p]rotecting
only material for which a clear and significant need for confidentiality has been shown will
reduce the burdensomeness of the order and render it less vulnerable to later challenge.”
Id. See generally Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1993).
32
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986). Although what
constitutes proper grounds is not uniform throughout the circuits, one commonality in
granting particularized protective orders is that the party seeking the protective order
carries the burden to justify confidentiality and establish the proper grounds to prove
“good cause.” Id.
33
United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Insur. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (1990). Umbrella
protective orders are defined as follows:
private-party agreements for unfettered access to all documents in an
adversary’s possession. Most commonly, the agreement conditions the
unfettered access on the sealing of entire classes of discovery and the
imposition of a gag order on the parties. These orders authorize each
party producing information to designate the information they desire
to keep confidential.
Chollet, supra note 18, at 702-03. The use of umbrella protective orders in discovery is
widely accepted and is standard practice in complex cases. United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d
at 1427. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 21.431 (1985). In complex
litigation, where voluminous documents are sought en masse, the discovery process may
endanger information that a litigant wants to keep confidential. Id. But see Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 226-27 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that protective
orders that automatically authorize sealing records filed in litigation, without individual
review, are not generally accepted. Additionally, this case demonstrates that documents
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of confidentiality allows each party to make discovery disclosures
without the delay and expense of adjudicating individual disputes over
each sensitive document.34 Additionally, umbrella protective orders
align with the overriding goal of the F.R.C.P., “to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.”35 Once the court grants
an umbrella protective order, the burden reverses—all discovery

under an umbrella protective order are subject to challenge to determine whether “good
cause” exists to include any particular document under the protective order).
34
Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir.
1999). Determinations of “good cause” do not need to be made on a document-bydocument basis:
In a case with thousands of documents, such a requirement might
impose an excessive burden on the district judge or magistrate judge.
There is no objection to an order that allows the parties to keep their
trade secrets (or some other properly demarcated category of
legitimately confidential information) out of the public record. . .
Id. See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (reasoning that “in complicated cases where document-by-document review of
discovery materials would be unfeasible,” broad protective orders should be granted “to
protect documents designated in good faith by the producing party as confidential”);
Chambers Dev. Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 104 F.R.D. 133, 135 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
(entering a protective order, providing in part that: “All documents produced in this
litigation in response to a formal discovery request and all information contained in such
documents shall be used solely for the prosecution and defense of the instant action and for
no other purpose or publication, whether directly or indirectly, and shall not be
disclosed. . .”); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON PROTECTIVE ORDERS,
CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICES ADDRESSING
PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES, 6 SEDONA CONF. J.
183 (2005), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/wg2
may05draft2 (in cases with large quantities of discovery materials, “a threshold showing of
‘good cause’ over broad categories of material may be sufficient for the issuance of a
protective order under F.R.C.P. 26(c). The purpose of the order would be to facilitate the
cooperative exchange of voluminous discovery.”).
35
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2006). A number of courts agree that umbrella protective orders that
allow “each litigant to seal all documents that it produces in pretrial discovery, are
unproblematic aids to the expeditious processing of complex commercial litigation.”
Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 178 F.3d at 945. There is no public right of access to
discovery before the entry of a judgment. See generally In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the lower court issued an umbrella
protective order, based on the fact that “it would be undesirable to have Mobil specify, and
the court rule on, objections to disclosure of particular documents, since that would slow
discovery enormously and involve the court excessively in the discovery process.”); United
States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (in complex
cases, “[p]articularly those involving large corporate parties, the parties agree to the
issuance of a broad protective order at the outset for their mutual protection, both from
their competitors and waiting predatory third parties. . . in those cases it is generally
conceded that either party could demonstrate the needed ‘good cause’ if put to the test.”).
Umbrella protective orders are mutually beneficial: defendants are assured confidentiality,
while plaintiffs get unfettered access. Chollet, supra note 18, at 702-03.
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materials are assumed to be protected and the party wishing to access
the information must prove the burden.36
Granting protective orders to limit access to discovery is within the
sound discretion of the court.37 The protections and features of
protective orders are well-established and standard during the discovery
phase of litigation; however, the process by which protective orders are
granted is unstructured and unclear.38
2.

Jumping Through Hoops: The Steps (or Lack Thereof) To Secure
Protective Orders

It is common during litigation for parties to designate documents as
confidential under the shield of a protective order, subject to court
approval.39 Protective orders can be granted on a motion from either
party to the litigation, including both the requesting party and the party
from whom the information is requested.40 Procedurally, protective
orders can be granted at any point during the litigation proceedings.41

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §11.432 (2004).
Essex Wire Corp. v. E. Electric Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969). It is
“beyond question that a court may issue orders prohibiting disclosure of documents or
information.” F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1982). Although the
F.R.C.P. indicates that “the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action,” the broad scope of discovery is subject to being restricted by
the issuance of a protective order “for good cause shown.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2006).
“The granting of such [a protective] order is a matter within the sound discretion of the
court.” Essex Wire Corp., 48 F.R.D. at 310. Protective orders may properly restrain public
disclosure of pretrial discovery:
Once the judicial powers of government are engaged, the public has a
legitimate interest in its appropriate exercise. When a court adopts a
protective order, what might otherwise be a private accommodation
among the parties becomes a public ordering. The court, through a
protective order, lends its legitimating force to an agreement between
the parties with respect to the pretrial disclosure of information. A
court order is enforceable by its summary sanctioning powers,
including the power to impose the sanction of contempt.
In re Consumer Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45, 48 (1985). See also Chem. & Indus.
Corp. v. Druffel & Commercial Solvents Corp., 301 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1962). Restrictions on
public access to discovery, through judicial issuance of a protective order, are appropriate
upon a showing of “good cause.” See infra Part II.B.2.a. for a discussion of F.R.C.P. 26(c)’s
“good cause” requirement.
38
See infra Part II.B.2.
39
Chollet, supra note 18, at n.17. “By far, the protective order is the prevalent method of
concealing information from public accessibility.” Id. at 705.
40
Smith v. The City of Chi., No. 04 C 2710, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26454, 5 (D. Ill. Oct. 31,
2005). Additionally, nonparties are permitted to intervene to contest or seek the issuance of
a protective order. Courts recognize that “non-parties have valid privacy concerns
36
37
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One Requirement, Four Divergent

Once the party seeking a protective order makes a motion in the
court where the action is pending, F.R.C.P. 26(c)’s “good cause”
requirement comes into play.42 F.R.C.P. 26(c) stipulates that upon
“motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought”
and “for good cause shown,” the court may issue a protective order.43
Neither F.R.C.P. 26(c) nor the U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a method
or process by which federal judges are to determine whether or not
“good cause” is satisfied.44 As a result, determination of “good cause” is
left to judicial discretion, the rigor of which may vary.45

regarding public disclosure of their personnel information.” Id. See also Knoll v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 365 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that it “is clear that [the employer]
defendants had a valid interest in the privacy of nonparty personnel files.”); Gehring v.
Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (disclosure of a non-party’s personnel files
“would invade the privacy of the other employees.”). The correct procedure by which a
nonparty can challenge a protective order “is through intervention for that purpose.”
United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d at 1427. See infra Part II.B.2.a. for a discussion on the various
methods employed by the courts to determine if the F.R.C.P.’s “good cause” requirement is
satisfied.
41
NY STATE TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOC., SECRETS KILL: WHY NEW YORK SHOULD ENACT THE
SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT (May 2004). In the pretrial phase:
A judge may be asked to issue a protective order which forbids the
plaintiff from sharing information disclosed during the case with
anyone, even government regulators. Corporate defendants sometimes
require such an order before they will disclose sensitive information
that could be publicly embarrassing or expose the company to further
lawsuits.
Id. At the conclusion of litigation, “a defendant can request the plaintiff to agree to an
order to seal all records in a case, including all exhibits and transcripts. Sealing orders can
go so far as to remove all trace that the lawsuit even existed.” Id. After a trial, defendants
“can ask for a confidentiality agreement that prohibits” the other party from “revealing
anything publicly about the case.” Id.
42
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (2006).
43
Id. (emphasis added). It is firmly established “that a party wishing to obtain an order
of protection over discovery material must demonstrate that ‘good cause’ exists for the
order of protection.” Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994). See,
e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d by 821 F.2d
139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987). “Good cause” is not satisfied and protective
orders cannot be issued when based merely on complexity or “emotionalism[.]” Id. at 570.
The court here held that the class members were entitled to disclosure of materials shielded
by a protective order in absence of a “good cause” showing. Id.
44
See infra Part IV (proposing a new approach and solution, the “Good Cause
Doctrine”).
45
See infra Parts II.B.2.a.i-iv (discussing and outlining the various approaches that
federal judges utilize in order to determine “good cause”).
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Rubber-Stamping Approach

One breed of judges simply, with no questions asked, rubber-stamps
protective orders that are mutually-agreed upon and not contested by
the litigating parties.46 This method of granting protective orders forgoes
judicial review when a protective order request is unopposed.47
Opponents criticize rubber-stamping and argue that mere mutual
agreement of the parties does not satisfy “good cause.”48
ii. Hostile Approach to Protective Orders: Resisting Confidentiality
Litigants, on the other hand, complain that some judges are
increasingly hostile to confidentiality orders and often resist granting
protective orders.49 Judges in this arena criticize protective orders on
46
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 785 (observing that “[d]isturbingly, some courts routinely sign orders
which contain confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety of such orders, or
the countervailing public interests which are sacrificed by the orders[.]”). See also Bd. of
Trustees of Cal. State. Univ. v. Sup. Ct., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 82, 90 (Ct. App. 2005) (advising
litigants that in order to obtain confidentiality, “parties could agree on a protective order as
to such documents at the outset”); Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden From the Public by Order of
the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 715 (2004)
(noting that “courts too often rubber-stamp confidentiality orders”).
47
Estate of Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 853 A.2d 880, 882 (N.J. 2004). At the
trial court level, the parties agreed to a protective order for all pretrial documents produced
by Goodyear Tire and, “without making any findings, a trial court signed the Protective
Order.” Id. at 882. “Under the terms of the protective order, Goodyear was permitted to
earmark as confidential certain information it produced during discovery.” Id. On appeal,
the court refused to enforce the protective order. Id. at 884. The court further reprimanded
the unreviewed manner in which it was issued by stating that trial courts should not
“rubber-stamp” protective order requests if they “are not accompanied by extrinsic support
demonstrating good cause for their approval.” Id. at 883.
48
Bryan v. Eichenwald, 191 F.R.D. 650, 652 (2000). Even if the motion for the protective
order is unopposed, the “determination of good cause cannot be left to mere agreement of
the parties.” Id. Judges are “duty-bound” to “review any request to seal the record (or part
of it)” and, therefore, “may not rubber stamp a stipulation to seal the record.” Citizens
First Nat’l Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (1999). On the other side of the
argument, proponents of upholding mutual, uncontested agreements amongst the
litigating parties to seal documents reason that:
if the parties are willing, for whatever reasons, to keep most
information secret, we ought to be willing to allow them to do that. I
say that not only because I believe that parties should be able to
control their own lawsuits, but also because, if we had a rule which
said that the judge must rule on claims of secrecy on a document-bydocument basis, who would be there to police the judge?
Morrison, supra note 27, at 121.
49
Jack E. Pace III, Testing the Security Blanket: An Analysis of Recent Challenges to Stipulated
Blanket Protective Orders, 19 Antitrust ABA 46 (Summer 2005). Since their inception,
protective orders have been hailed as “an efficient way to lay down ground rules and
preemptively resolve discovery disputes.” Id. More and more, however, courts refuse to
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two grounds: confidentiality unduly limits public access and “good
cause” is not proven.50 The threshold for “good cause” among this
group of judges is high and F.R.C.P. 26(c)’s protective order provision is
essentially disregarded.51
iii. Detailed Approach: Requirement of Specificity
Other judges require a specific showing of “good cause” before
granting a protective order.52 Judges subscribing to this approach argue
that it is necessary to “make an independent determination of good
cause prior to issuing a protective order, even if the parties submit an

grant protective orders: “Even where both parties agree to limitations on the use of their
opponent’s confidential information—and there is no live dispute before the court
concerning the use of that information—courts increasingly are rejecting” protective orders
that the parties stipulate. Id.
50
Pace, supra note 49, at 46. See Polo v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 04-259-DRH
(S.D. III. June 7, 2004) (order denying a joint motion for a protective order). Polo involved
price-fixing claims against seed manufacturers. The parties proposed the protective order
out of “concern that sensitive information could be misused” by the other manufacturer “in
the absence of strict confidentiality protections.” Pace, supra note 49. The court, however,
denied the protective order because of a lack of good cause. Id. The court further
described the parties’ uncontested protective order as a “fudge” and invited the parties to
submit a “tightly-drawn order which keeps secret only trade secrets or other narrowly
defined categories of documents.” Id.
51
See Beech-Nut Nutrition v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. CIV-S-01-1920 GEB PAN 1, 4 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 17, 2003) (order rejecting stipulated protective order). In this case between
competitors in the baby food business, the court rejected a protective order that would
have established “‘two tiers of ‘confidentiality’ and allowed both parties to protect” their
commercially-sensitive materials “from falling into the hands of their opponent’s
employees involved in competitive decision making.” Pace, supra note 49. While
acknowledging that the “stipulated order [was] intended to facilitate the discovery
process,” the court held that the “parties have not shown good cause why such
information”—which both sides agreed was “highly sensitive”—required protection. Id.
52
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981) (the party seeking the protective
order must submit “a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from
stereotyped and conclusory statements”). Broad allegations, unsubstantiated by specific
and detailed examples of harm and possible injuries are insufficient and do not
substantiate a “good cause” showing. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987). See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23
F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that “broad allegations of harm are not specific to
establish good cause” for a protective order); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059,
1071 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Good cause is established on a showing that disclosure will work a
clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure,” but the “injury must be
shown with specificity”); Hobley v. Burge, 225 F.R.D. 221, 224 (2004) (which also utilizes
the language “clearly defined and serious injury” in describing the method to establish
whether good cause exists); Bryan v. Eichenwald, 191 F.R.D. 650, 652 (2000) (“In the
absence of such showing, the court does not find good cause for filing documents under
seal.”).
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agreed protective order.”53
Because courts are charged with
independently concluding whether a particularized showing of fact
warrants “good cause,” the method and rigor that judges employ
varies.54
iv. The Sedona Approach 55
The 2005 draft Sedona Guidelines developed a readily satisfied
threshold for obtaining protective orders, but its vague explanation did
not develop a step-by-step method or provide additional clarity to the
“good cause” requirement.56 In short, “good cause” is satisfied under
53
Smith v. The City of Chi., No. 04 C 2710, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26454 at 2. See Citizens
First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 178 F.3d at 945 (“The judge is the primary representative of the
public interest in the judicial process” and has an independent duty to “review any request
to seal the record (or part of it)”). The district court is best situated to determine relevant
factors, and it should consider each case individually:
Discretion should be left with the court to evaluate the competing
considerations in light of the facts of individual cases. By focusing on
the particular circumstances in the cases before them, courts are in the
best position to prevent both the overtly broad use of [protective]
orders and the unnecessary denial of confidentiality for information
that deserves it. . .
Miller, supra note 26, at 492. Under this method, modifications of protective orders follow
the same guidelines. Id. As long as a protective order remains in effect, the court that
entered the order retains the power to modify it. United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Insur.
Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (1990). Modification of a protective order, “like its original entry, is
left to the discretion of the district court.” Id. See Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 218 (6th
Cir. 1982) (holding that the issue of whether a protective order, once issued, should be
lifted or modified should be “left to the sound discretion of the trial court”).
54
See Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994); Glenmede
Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003).
55
The Sedona Conference is a nonprofit law and policy think tank dedicated to the
advanced study and development of complex civil litigation, as well as antitrust and
intellectual property law. The Working Group Series brings together recognized lawyers
and academics to discuss current issues that are either ripe for solution or in need of a
“boost” to advance law and policy. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON
PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST
PRACTICES ADDRESSING PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS IN CIVIL
CASES, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 183 (2005), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/
content/miscFiles/wg2may05draft2. Specifically, this Sedona Conference Working Group
“was formed out of a desire to help bring some clarity and uniformity to practices
involving protective orders in civil litigation and determinations affecting public access to
documents filed or referred to in court.” Id. The goal of this Working Group is to provide
immediate guidance in an effort to reconcile public access and protective orders. Id.
56
Id. In some cases, parties assert “legitimate reasons to limit the dissemination of
certain information exchanged in the normal course of discovery.” Id. Therefore, when
discovery requires “disclosure of sensitive, confidential information involving matrimonial,
financial, medical or family matters, or in commercial cases, trade secrets and other
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the Sedona approach as long as one of the litigating parties is able to
articulate a legitimate need for confidentiality.57
At most, this
recommendation emphasizes that F.R.C.P. 26(c)’s “good cause” standard
does not require a detailed or particularized showing in order to be
satisfied.58
In response to the numerous, inconsistent “good cause” tests used by
the courts and the failure of F.R.C.P. 26(c) to outline judicial criteria by
which to grant protective orders, the Third Circuit adopted an
innovative approach to guide judges and provide consistency among the
circuits.59
b.

The Third Circuit’s Approach to Resolving the “Good Cause” Dilemma

i.

Pre-Pansy: Balancing Interests

Even before the Third Circuit in Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg60
articulated and enumerated specific factors to consider in applying a
balancing test for granting protective orders, federal circuits around the
nation applied a similar balancing test, weighing the litigants’ privacy
interests against the importance of disclosure.61 A decade before the
confidential business information,” protective orders are the way in which judges protect
the legitimate need for confidentiality. Id.
57
Id. The Working Group articulated that: “the good cause standard generally should
be considered to be satisfied so long as the parties can articulate a legitimate need for
privacy or confidentiality, in those instances where the protective order will apply only to
the disclosure of information exchanged during discovery.” Id. The term “legitimate
need” is not further defined. Id.
58
Id. Further, the Working Group noted that: “Because of the limited scope and
provisional nature of the protective order, the court need not conduct a detailed
evidentiary inquiry into the nature of the information at issue, which courts are sometimes
unwilling or often practically unable to do. . .” Id.
59
See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the Third Circuit’s “good cause” balancing test).
60
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994). See infra Part II.B.2.b.ii
(discussing the Pansy test in detail).
61
See infra notes 61-64 (discussing the inception of the “good cause” balancing test). But
see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 911-12 (E.D. Pa.
1981). Plaintiffs in an antitrust case moved for vacatur of a pretrial protective order in its
entirety. Although the District Court applied a balancing test to validate the protective
order, it refused to develop a categorical process by which courts should evaluate “good
cause” and emphasized that individual factors must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Id. This court noted that:
To apply a balancing test, of course, the particularized interests of the
litigants for and against disclosure must be weighed. . . The court must
evaluate the magnitude and imminence of the threatened harm from
disclosure, including the particularized interests of the litigants against
disclosure and the general government interests enumerated above,
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Pansy decision, the Fourth Circuit articulated criteria to balance when
determining “good cause.”62 The Fourth Circuit’s process balanced the
reason public access is sought, the importance or necessity of public
access to the documents, and whether the information furthers improper
purposes.63 In the same year, the Seventh Circuit, following in the
footsteps of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, employed a similar balancing
test, weighing the interests of the party seeking disclosure against the
importance of the litigants’ privacy.64 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit
the narrowness of the proposed limiting order, and the availability of
less restrictive alternatives. We cannot, of course, delineate precisely
the application of the test except on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 912. This balancing test ensures that litigants are guaranteed the necessary materials
and, at the same time, “protect[s] from unwarranted harm parties whose rights may
ultimately be vindicated at trial.” Id.
62
In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1984). See infra note 63 (discussing In re
Knight Pub. Co.).
63
Id. In In re Knight Pub. Co., a newspaper reporter, who was denied access to a district
courtroom, challenged the protective order sealing a state senator’s trial. The Fourth
Circuit applied a balancing test to determine if a protective order was appropriate:
factors to be weighed in the balancing test include whether the records
are sought for improper purposes, such as promoting public scandals
or unfairly gaining a business advantage; whether release would
enhance the public’s understanding of an important historical event;
and whether the public has already had access to the information
contained in the records.
Id. at 235. Documents may accordingly be sealed “if the public’s right of access is
outweighed by competing interests.” Id. Here, the district court erred in “giving too little
weight to the presumption favoring access and making its decision to seal the documents
without benefit of Knight’s arguments for access.” Id. The Fourth Circuit based its analysis
on the criteria previously utilized by the Tenth Circuit, compelling the court to balance the
aforementioned interests granting a protective order.
In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1982). On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the application of the balancing test for granting a
protective order. Id. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit held that:
The relevance of the requested documents is not an issue in this case.
Hence, the appropriate balancing test does not concern the relevance
of the information sought vis-a-vis the burden imposed upon the
responding party. Rather, we are concerned with the burden imposed
upon the responding party if a protective order is not granted as
compared with the burden imposed upon the requesting party if a
protective order imposing conditions is granted.
Id. Florida argued that the amount of money involved, $8,000, was insubstantial when
compared to Kerr-McGee’s total assets. Id. This argument failed because when balancing
the interests, the monetary imposition constituted an undue burden and expense within
F.R.C.P 26(c), and on the other side of the balance, the burden placed on Florida by the
protective order was not a harsh one. Id.
64
Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs
brought pharmaceutical product liability actions against drug companies for injuries
allegedly caused by exposure to a drug. Id. at 557. On appeal, the court held that the
district court did not adequately weigh the competing hardships to determine the
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balanced comparable factors in a products liability action when it upheld
the court’s issuance of a protective order that kept the names of
participants in a research study confidential.65
Although the criteria and methods used in each instance varied, the
circuits began to solidify a balancing test trend to determine “good
cause.”66 The Third Circuit utilized this groundwork in Pansy to develop
a list of factors for judges to consider when determining whether
F.R.C.P.’s “good cause” requirement is satisfied.67
ii. The Pansy Balancing Test
Specifically, the Third Circuit operates under the guidelines that a
protective order cannot be granted unless and until the proponent can
indicate, with specificity, that disclosure would cause a “clearly defined
and serious injury.”68 In Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg,69 the court
appropriateness of discovery. Id. When protection is sought, the court must “apply a
balancing test to determine whether the need of the party seeking disclosure outweighs the
adverse effect such disclosure would have on the policies underlying the [claimed]
privilege.” Id. at 559 (internal quotations omitted). Specifically, “the court must compare
the hardship to the party [or person] against whom discovery is sought, if discovery is
allowed, with the hardship to the party seeking discovery, if discovery is denied.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). Thus, this matter was remanded to review the nature and
magnitude of the competing hardships. Id. at 566.
65
Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir.1985). In this products
liability action against a tampon manufacturer seeking recovery for injuries suffered from
toxic shock syndrome (TSS), the Center for Disease Control (a nonparty) sought a
protective order to keep the identities of women that participated in the TSS research
confidential. The court noted that “federal courts have superimposed a somewhat more
demanding balancing of interests approach” to granting protective orders under F.R.C.P.
26(c). Id. at 1547. Under this standard, “the district court’s duty was to balance P & G’s
interest in obtaining the names and addresses of the study participants against the Center’s
interest in keeping that information confidential.” Id. The appellate court validated the
protective order, holding that the district court “acted within its discretion in holding that
the Center’s interests in keeping its study participants’ names confidential outweigh the
discovery interests of P & G.” Id.
66
See supra notes 60-64.
67
See infra Part II.B.2.b.ii (discussing the Pansy balancing test in detail).
68
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3rd Cir. 1994). See also Shingara v.
Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that Pansy “explained that there is good
cause when a party shows that disclosure will result in a clearly defined, specific and
serious injury,” and that “broad allegations of harm are not sufficient to establish good
cause”). See infra Part III.A for an in-depth analysis of how subsequent courts have applied
and modified Pansy.
69
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 772. In Pansy, a former police chief filed a civil rights suit. Id. at 775.
The parties obtained a protective order, but the press moved for the court to vacate the
confidentiality agreement. Id. at 775. In denying the press’ request, the court held that the
judiciary possessed an “inherent power to grant orders of confidentiality over materials not
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enunciated balancing test factors for courts to consider when
determining “good cause.”70 Generally, according to the analysis set
forth in Pansy, a court should balance the following factors prior to
issuing a protective order:
(1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests;
(2) whether the information is being sought for a
legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose; (3)
whether disclosure of the information will cause a party
embarrassment; (4) whether confidentiality is being
sought over information important to public health and
safety; (5) whether the sharing of information among
litigants will promote fairness and efficiency; (6)
whether a party benefiting from the order of
confidentiality is a public entity or official; and (7)
whether the case involves issues important to the
public.71

in the court file,” most clearly, discovery. Id. at 785. The Pansy court laid groundwork and
articulated criteria for a “good cause” balancing test. Id. at 786. A protective order cannot
be issued without first weighing public and private interests to determine whether “good
cause” exists:
All such orders are intended to offer litigants a measure of privacy,
while balancing against this privacy interest the public’s right to obtain
information concerning judicial proceedings. . . whether an order of
confidentiality is granted at the discovery stage or any other stage of
litigation, including settlement, good cause must be demonstrated to
justify the order.
Id. Especially when the case involves “private litigants, and concerns matters of little
legitimate public interest,” the court should weigh in favor of granting a protective order to
preserve confidentiality. Id. at 788. See infra Part II.B.2.a for an extended discussion and
identification of the application of the “good cause” requirement.
70
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786-87. Courts should apply this balancing test when considering
whether to grant a protective order at any stage of litigation. Id. But see United States v.
Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 425 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (“It does not appear
that a mere balancing test would adequately ensure the broad and liberal treatment to be
accorded the federal discovery rules.”).
71
Shingara, 420 F.3d at 306 (citing Glenmede Trust Co., 56 F.3d at 483; Pansy, 23 F.3d at
787-91). Interestingly, the relevancy of the information is not a consideration in
determining whether to grant a protective order. See Smith v. The City of Chi., No. 04 C
2710, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26454 at 1-10. Here, the court broadened Pansy by considering
the relevancy of information when considering a protective order request. In this case, the
City sought to protect the confidentiality of the personnel and payroll records of city
employees produced during discovery. Id. The court relied on Seventh Circuit precedent
that makes it clear that “a trial judge must make an independent determination of good
cause prior to issuing a protective order, even if the parties submit an agreed protective
order.” Id. at 2. Specifically, the judge has an independent duty to balance the public’s
interest against the “property and privacy interests of the litigants.” Id. at 2. This analysis
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This balancing test, which specifically addressed the confidentiality of a
settlement agreement, requires the court to consider the requesting
party’s need for the information against the possible injury that may
result from compelled disclosure.72
When considering the possible harm to the litigants, this balancing
process compels judges to grant protective orders in instances where
confidentiality would outweigh the benefit of public access and prevent
unnecessary injury to the litigating parties.73 If the risk of harm to the

differs from Pansy, however, in that it prioritizes the relevancy of the information to the
litigation—information important to the litigation is less likely to be subject to
confidentiality restrictions. In this matter, “good cause” exists to enter a protective order
prohibiting public disclosure of social security numbers, salaries, and home addresses of
city employees, because such information is irrelevant and public disclosure may cause
unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment and would unfairly invade the privacy of City
employees. Id. at 6. See also Empire of Carolina, Inc. v. Mackle, 108 F.R.D. 323, 327 (S.D.
Fla. 1985) (the court considered relevancy in denying a motion to compel production
because the materials sought were “at best of limited relevance” and their disclosure
presented “the spectre of catastrophic harm.”).
72
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787. See Shingara, 420 F.3d at 301. The district court distinguished
Shingara from Pansy, as Shingara involved a protective order over discovery materials,
whereas Pansy addressed confidentiality of a settlement agreement. Id. Although the
district court acknowledged Pansy, by recognizing that it must “balance the privacy
interests of the parties against the public interest in access to the discovery information,” it
ultimately rebutted the Pansy criteria and determined that the analysis should not be based
on the fact that it involved a public official, the Pennsylvania Police, and the fact that it is
an issue of public concern. Id. at 306. The Third Circuit determined that regardless of these
factual differences, the same balancing process applies. Id. at 307. The case was remanded,
noting that protection is available where “good cause” exists and that “a district court may
determine that good cause exists only based on reasoning that is true to the direction,
language and spirit of Pansy.” Id. at 308.
73
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787. “It is appropriate for courts to order confidentiality to prevent
the infliction of unnecessary or serious pain on parties who the court reasonably finds are
entitled to such protection. In this vein, a factor to consider is whether the information is
being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose.” Id. See Glenmede Trust
Co., 56 F.3d at 476. When considering a protective order, the Third Circuit applied Pansy
and lifted a protective order because injury to the private litigants did not exceed the
public’s interest. In this case, Glenmede sought a protective order to keep documents
confidential. Id. at 481. The district court denied Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton’s initial
motion for a protective order, holding that it did not satisfy Pansy’s “good cause”
requirement. Id. On appeal, the court held that “good cause” exists “when it is specifically
demonstrated that disclosure will cause a clearly defined and serious injury,” based on the
seven factors that Pansy enumerates. Id. at 483. This analysis “should always reflect a
balancing of private versus public interests,” considering and “focusing on the particular
circumstances” of each case in order to prevent the “unnecessary denial of confidentiality
for information that deserves it.” Id. Here, Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton asserted that
general allegations of injury to reputation or embarrassment were not specifically
articulated, as Pansy requires, and therefore insufficient and preclude protective order
protection. Id. at 485. Because they failed to demonstrate a specific injury from public
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litigant seeking protection prevails over the public interest, then
disclosure cannot be compelled.74
The Pansy balancing factors provide Third Circuit judges with a
framework for considering the F.R.C.P.’s “good cause” requirement.
Pansy does not, however, address the issue of trade secrets, an interest
that various courts, and F.R.C.P. 26(c) itself, recognize as “good cause”
for confidentiality under protective orders.75
3.

The Trade Secret Dimension: Trade Secrets as “Good Cause” for
Confidentiality

Trade secrets are secret by their very nature.76 When trade secrets
are involved in the discovery process, a Catch-22 dilemma emerges:
litigants must disclose the requested trade secrets during the discovery
process while simultaneously protecting those same trade secrets from
further unlawful use. 77

access of the privileged documents, a protective order in this matter was not valid under
the Pansy criteria. Id.
74
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786-87. The public interest component of the balancing test revolves
around protecting public safety and health, promoting public respect for the judiciary, and
assuring that judges perform their duties in an informed manner. The public’s legitimate
interests in this information must be balanced with the interest of the private litigant who
seeks to conceal the discovery. Proponents of public access maintain that “pretrial access to
information helps the public better understand judicial proceedings and public confidence
in the judicial system as a whole can be enhanced.” In Re Consumer Power Co. Sec. Litig.,
109 F.R.D. 45, 54 (1985). When the newspaper here challenged a protective order entered in
a securities action, the court upheld the order as appropriate. When these “functional
needs of society” are balanced against “the functional needs of the judicial system,” the
“scope of public access may need to be narrowed and its timing deferred.” Id. at 54. But see
Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993) (the court
here did not recognize a public right of access to discovery materials).
75
See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing trade secrets as satisfying “good cause” under F.R.C.P.
26(c)).
76
See CNF Packing Co. v. BP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Absent any
protective order, documents produced in litigation may be used for any purpose, including
direct competition. Thus, protective orders are essential in trade secret litigation.” Denise
H. McClelland & Shannah J. Morris, The ‘Attorneys’ Eyes Only’ Designation and other
Disclosure Restrictions in Trade Secrets Litigation, 13 Bus. Torts 7 (2006). See generally In re
Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d at 356-57.
77
McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7. Protection of trade secrets is sufficient “good
cause” to satisfy the requirement of Rule 26(c) in granting protective orders:
One means of showing ‘good cause,’ and therefore a frequent subject
of a Court directed protective order is the so-called trade secret or
secret process. While Courts have generally allowed this information
to be discovered, they have limited this right by issuing a protective
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Although Pansy does not enumerate trade secrets as a factor to
consider when granting protective orders, courts in every federal circuit
have held that restricting or denying access to discovery materials may
be necessary to protect trade secrets.78 When determining whether to
issue a protective order in trade secret litigation, the stakes are high.79

order which prohibits the disclosure of this information to anyone not
directly connected with the preparation of the case.
Essex Wire Corp., 48 F.R.D. at 310. The logic applied by the court in granting this type of
protective order is that “if this information were disclosed, the moving party would suffer
great competitive disadvantage and irreparable harm,” which outweighs the interest in
public access. Id. See Covey Oil Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 1965)
(holding that discovery was to be made available “only to counsel and independent
certified public accountants and only for the purposes of the case. The court forbade the
use of the material ‘for business or competitive purposes’. . .The right to further protective
orders upon an appropriate showing was specifically recognized.”); Parsons v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that the party seeking the
protective order must “demonstrate that the material sought to be protected is confidential
and that disclosure will create a competitive disadvantage for the party”); United States v.
Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (the court granted defendant
corporation discovery of its competitor’s sales data for the limited purpose of preparing a
defense to the action. The “data requested in the instant case does not involve secret
processes or customer lists, categories which have traditionally been considered to be
entitled to greater protection”). The “good cause” requirement is satisfied and justified
when the court issues protective orders to prevent the disclosure of trade secrets.
Protective orders ensure that “confidential business information is not revealed to the
public.” Essex Wire Corp., 48 F.R.D. at 310.
78
See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (“courts have refused to permit their files to serve. . . as
sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing”). A
sample of federal circuit decisions that restrict access to discovery to protect trade secrets is
as follows: In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (in determining whether
the district court properly sealed the motions in a state senator’s trial, the Fourth Circuit
determined that a factor to consider is whether not issuing a protective order will result in
“unfairly gaining a business advantage”); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d, 141, 147 (2d
Cir. 1995) (in illustrating the limits to public access, the court noted that the public has in
the past been excluded from court proceedings to protect trade secrets); Leucadia, Inc. v.
Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 1993) (in the manufacturer’s action
against competitor alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, the district court entered a
protective order for discovery documents containing confidential information. On appeal,
the court held that when a district court determines whether sealed documents contained
bona fide trade secrets, for good cause shown, it may grant a protective order requiring
that “a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.”); In re Knoxville News-Sentinel
Co. Inc., 723 F.2d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 1983) (in considering a protective order, the court noted
that there are exceptions which limit the public’s right of access to judicial records. The
right to inspect judicial records is not absolute and “access has been denied where” they
include “sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive
standing.”); Huntsman-Christensen Corp. v. Entrada Indus., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 733, 736
(C.D. Utah 1986) (plaintiffs initially obtained an order sealing the complaint to facilitate
settlement negotiations. The parties, however, failed to resolve their differences.
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As a result, three levels of restricted disclosure exist to protect
discovery materials in trade secret litigation.80 The lowest level of
discovery protection, which simply restricts public access without
Defendants sought an extension of the court’s order sealing the complaint. In making its
decision, the court cited Nixon, indicating that “that the factors to be weighed in the
balancing test include whether the records are sought for improper purposes, such as
promoting a public scandal or unfairly gaining a business advantage.”); In re Iowa
Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1983) (the court here closed the
hearing to avoid public disclosure of trade secrets and then redacted versions of the
hearing transcripts, pleadings, and exhibits that were filed on public record. The court
provided that if “it determines that secrets are involved, it should then return to the
courtroom, announce this determination, and state that the remainder of the proceeding
will be conducted in camera.”); Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 268,
275 (Cl. Ct. 1998) (a common justification for limiting public access if trade secrets are
contained therein. In this proceeding, the danger of publicly disclosing GE’s trade secrets
justified keeping certain portions of pleadings and hearing transcripts in camera—GE can
file redacted versions of the transcripts and pleadings).
79
Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt Health Care Corp. v. Trude, 880 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1994).
If a trade secret is released to the public, “one can never put the genie back in the bottle.”
Morrison, supra note 27, at 113. Once trade secret information is released, it cannot be
recalled: “the injury suffered by petitioners, assuming their adversaries have no right to
this disclosure under the Civil Rules, will be complete upon compliance with the order and
such injury could not thereafter be rectified in subsequent proceedings in this case.”
Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt Health Care Corp., 880 S.W.2d at 541-42. See also Gen. Elec. Co.
v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that once
trade secrets are disclosed, the potential harm cannot be remedied or protected against).
Trade secrets warrant protection. Therefore, if the court is uncertain as to whether or not a
trade secret will be adversely affected, the court should grant the protective order as the
possibility of inadvertently releasing information through discovery is not to be taken
lightly:
Inadvertence, like the thief-in-the-night, is no respecter of its victims.
Inadvertent or accidental disclosure may or may not be predictable. To
the extent that it may be predicted, and cannot be adequately
forestalled in the design of a protective order, it may be a factor in the
access decision.
AFP Advanced Food Prod. LLC v. Snyder’s of Hanover Mfg., Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-3006, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 426, 2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730
F.2d 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (deciding whether in-house patent attorneys should be
given access to confidential information through discovery in patent infringement cases)).
But see Ventrassist Pty. Ltd. v. Heartware, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that any discovery would “damage” the defendant
because the plaintiff and defendant were competitors in manufacturing medical devices
and access would give the plaintiff a “competitive advantage.” The court held that this
concern was illusory because under the protective order the defendant could restrict
dissemination of discovery materials under the confidential or attorneys’ eyes only
designations).
80
McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7. Formally, three levels of restricted
disclosure have emerged to protect discovery materials in trade secret cases: “confidential,”
“attorneys and client representative(s)” protection, and “attorneys’ eyes only.” Id. These
“levels of protection have been adopted to balance access to discovery” against the “misuse
of documents and information containing trade secrets produced in discovery.” Id.
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affecting the litigants’ access, is termed “confidential.”81
The
intermediate level of protection, which restricts the litigating parties’
access, is known as “attorneys and client representative(s)” protection.82
“Attorneys’ eyes only[,]” the most restrictive level of protection,
provides that such information is only to be shared with the parties’ legal
counsel and, in certain cases, outside experts.83 Courts have also
provided that multiple levels of protection may be appropriate for
different documents in a single case.84
The approaches to ascertain “good cause” and grant protective
orders on the federal level vary among and within the circuits.85 A
uniform federal process to determine what constitutes “good cause” is
nonexistent. The Third Circuit’s Pansy balancing test begins to set the

Id. Information designated as “Confidential” is not disseminated to the public, but
instead can only be used in that particular litigation. However, these materials may be
shared and/or reviewed by all of the parties to the suit, witnesses, experts, legal counsel,
and anyone else directly involved in the litigation. Id. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. Carter, 204
F.R.D. 410, 416 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (although the trade secrets warranted protection, the court
determined that the lowest level of protection, “confidential,” was sufficient and would
increase the level of protection afforded to the trade secrets to the “attorneys’ eyes only”
designation).
82
McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7. This intermediate category allows counsel to
have access “to all the opponent’s trade secret information, but only one or a few client
representatives, agreed to by the client and the litigation opponent, may receive access to
such information.” Id. See Uniroyal Chem. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot., 24 F.R.D. 53, 58 (D.
Conn. 2004) (the court imposed a less-restrictive middle level of protection—by restricting
it to counsel, outside experts, and three designated employees of each company—
demonstrating that the client’s needs for certain highly confidential documents outweighed
the opposing party’s desire to keep them entirely confidential); Zweidinger v. Toyota
Motor Corp., C.A. No. 94C-06-008, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 327 (Del. 1995) (the court
granted a protective order but refused to limit it to “attorneys’ eyes only,” and instead
stipulated that outside counsel, legal staff, one employee of each party, and in-house
counsel for each party could have access to the discovery).
83
McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7. See, e.g., Grayzel v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 162
Fed. Appx. 954, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (a protective order clearly stipulated who was privy to
“Confidential” and “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” materials, differentiating the two as different
levels of protection. These provisions expressly prohibit persons who come into possession
of any such information from disclosing it outside of the litigation, regardless of the use).
84
McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7. Clients seeking to protect trade secrets may
use any combination of the three tier designations: confidentiality, attorney plus client
representative(s), and attorneys’ eyes only. See Blanchard & Co. v. Barrick Gold Corp.,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5719 (E.D. La. 2004) (the court granted a two-tier protective order,
including both “confidential” and “attorneys’ eyes only” levels of protection, because of the
parties’ competitive relationship). Although each aforementioned level of disclosure
“impedes the public’s access to court records,” the vulnerability of trade secrets renders
this restriction within the court’s discretion, as the litigants’ specific interests outweighs the
presumption of public access. McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7.
85
See supra Part II.B.2.
81
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proper groundwork, but is inadequate overall because it only provides a
narrow list of considerations.86 At the state level, legislatures actively
adopted legislation to govern protective orders, but continue to fall short
of developing a methodical approach for judges to apply when granting
protective orders.87
C. “Sunshine in Litigation” Statutes:
Individual Confidentiality

Increasing Access at the Cost of

Sunshine is said to be the best of disinfectants.88
Although Seattle Times allows limitations on the public’s access to
discovery materials, the debate regarding the amount of public access to
all facets of discovery is unresolved.89 Federal and state legislators who
oppose protective orders attempt to circumvent the Supreme Court’s
holding in Seattle Times by enacting “sunshine” legislation aimed at
stifling protective orders and, in effect, maximizing public access to
discovery.90

See supra Part II.B.2.b.
See infra Part II.C (outlining state statutes aimed at restricting confidentiality in
litigation).
88
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (1914).
89
See supra notes 24-25, for a discussion and analysis of Seattle Times. “At the
rulemaking level, the Advisory Committee circulated a proposal to amend the protective
order rule to address some of these concerns in 1993, but the Judicial Conference declined
to adopt that proposed amendment. After considering the issue further, the Committee
decided in March 1998, that it would not propose any further changes to the protective
order rule and the matter remains in the legislative arena.” Id. See also Richard L. Marcus,
Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 180 (1999).
90
NY STATE TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOC., SECRETS KILL: WHY NEW YORK SHOULD ENACT THE
SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT (May 2004). The term “sunshine” derived from the oft-cited
statement of Justice Louis D. Brandeis, “[s]unshine is said to be the best of disinfectants.”
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (1914). Proponents of these laws believe
that “[f]ocusing sunlight on public hazards will make it possible to stop them from
harming others and, with the benefit of public debate, to help lawmakers and government
officials address any underlying statutory and regulatory deficiencies that allowed the
hazards to occur in the first place.” NY STATE TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOC., SECRETS KILL: WHY
NEW YORK SHOULD ENACT THE SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT (May 2004). The “sunshine”
statutes and other limits on confidentiality “reflect the balance that courts and legislatures
have attempted to strike between the need for confidential settlements” and “competing
interests,” such as public access. Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows:
Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 679 (2001).
86
87
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The Proposed Federal “Sunshine in Litigation” Legislation

At the federal level, there are currently no statutory provisions
specifically enumerating the criteria for judges to consider when
granting protective orders.91 Opponents of protective orders have
introduced bills into Congress with the objective of enacting an official
presumption of public access to all phases of litigation, including
discovery, in order to protect public health and safety.92 The underlying
purpose of the proposed federal legislation, titled the “Sunshine in
Litigation Act,” is to curb judicial discretion to issue protective orders.93
If adopted, the sunshine provision would restrict federal judges’

91
See infra Part II.B.2.b. Proponents of establishing a federal standard to determine
“good cause” argue that federal judges have too much discretion, and that too much
discretion can lead to abuse. 151 CONG. REC. S7831 (June 30, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
92
Grimaldi, supra note 18. Senator Kohl (D-WI) “first introduced the bill in 1990 after a
Washington Post series uncovered a trend of manufacturers using court-imposed
confidentiality orders to limit public debate about companies’ products.” Id. The Sunshine
in Litigation Act would have established additional procedural requirements—including
multiple hearings and specific findings—before a trial judge could close records or
proceedings. Chollet, supra note 18, at 734-35. Additionally, the Act would have
prohibited the issuance of a protective order anytime public health or safety is at issue. Id.
93
149 CONG. REC. S4963-S4964 (April 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kohl). When Senator
Kohl reintroduced the Sunshine in Litigation Act in 2003 he emphasized that its purpose
was to curb a judge’s discretion in granting protective orders:
Currently, judges have broad discretion in granting protective orders
when ‘good cause’ is shown. But these protective orders are being
misused.
Tobacco companies, automobile manufacturers and
pharmaceutical companies have settled with victims and used the legal
system to hide information which, if it became public, could protect
the American public but endanger their business or reputation. We
can all agree that the only appropriate use for such orders is to protect
trade secrets and other truly confidential company information and
[this] legislation makes sure it is protected.
Id. at S4936. Senator Kohl also outlined his rationale for supporting the Sunshine in
Litigation Act as being based on a precedent of discretionary judicial granting of protective
orders:
The problem is a simple one and has been recurring for decades. An
individual brings a cause of action against a manufacturer. . . The
plaintiff, often reticent to continue the litigation process because of
grief or lack of resources, settles the lawsuit quickly. In exchange, the
defendant insists that the plaintiff agree to the inclusion of a
confidentiality clause. This mechanism prevents either party from
disclosing information revealed during the process of litigation. Both
of the parties to the lawsuit believe that they have ‘won:’ the plaintiff
won a satisfactory financial settlement, and the defendant won the
right to conceal ‘smoking gun’ documents.
Id. In short, Kohl believes that “it is time to initiate a federal solution for this problem.” Id.
(emphasis added).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/9

Kutz: Rethinking the "Good Cause" Requirement: A New Federal Approach t

2007]

Rethinking the “Good Cause” Requirement

317

discretion by requiring a particularized finding of fact prior to granting a
protective order.94
2.

State Approaches to Limit Protective Orders

On the state level, a handful of states have adopted and enacted
modified versions of the federally-proposed “Sunshine in Litigation
Act,” to limit the courts’ power to issue protective orders and allow
public access to discovery materials.95 Among the jurisdictions that have
enacted sunshine legislation, the approaches and processes implemented
vary.96 The majority of state statutes, although different in scope and
content, focus on compelling the release of information if nondisclosure
would potentially affect public health or safety.97 The most effective way
to examine and differentiate these statutes is to categorize states by those
that include a trade secret exception and those that do not afford
protection to trade secrets.98

94
Id. Senator Kohl outlined the process federal courts would follow if his 2005 proposal
was adopted:
The Sunshine in Litigation Act is a modest proposal that would require
Federal judges to perform a simple balancing test to ensure that the
defendant’s interest in secrecy truly outweighs the public interest in
information related to public health and safety. Specifically, prior to
making any portion of a case confidential or sealed, a judge would
have to determine by making a particularized finding of fact—that
doing so would not restrict the disclosure of information relevant to
public health and safety.
151 CONG. REC. S7831 (June 30, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kohl). By requiring this finding of
fact prior to allowing a protective order, Kohl argues that this “would not restrict the
disclosure of information relevant to public health and safety.” 149 CONG. REC. S4964
(April 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
95
See infra Parts II.C.2.a-c (outlining the various state approaches). In pushing for federal
legislation, Senator Kohl noted that “[s]ome states have been proactive” in developing
sunshine legislation. 149 CONG. REC. S4964 (April 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kohl). The
majority of the state-enacted measures stress “the possible utility of information obtained
through discovery in revealing risks to public health.” Marcus, supra note 88, at 180.
96
Rooks, supra note 21, at 18. “Different jurisdictions have taken varied approaches,
often depending on the particular secrecy mechanism addressed, but their thrust is usually
to require greater judicial scrutiny rather than to ban secrecy altogether.” Id. Some
common examples include: declaring a presumption of openness for all court records in the
jurisdiction; limiting circumstances in which protective orders may be entered; requiring a
showing of good cause before approving secrecy, with the burden on the secrecy
proponent; requiring public hearings before orders are granted; allowing intervention by
interested nonparties; and specifying certain matters that may not be kept secret. Id.
97
See infra Parts II.C.2.a-c.
98
See infra Parts II.C.2.a-c. The states that afford protection to trade secrets are: Florida,
Texas, Washington and Louisiana. Arkansas, on the other hand, does not protect trade
secrets. Virginia’s law provides a unique information-sharing framework.
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State Statutes that Require Public Hazard Disclosure, but Provide for a
Trade Secret Exception: Florida, Texas, Washington, and Louisiana

Florida’s Sunshine in Litigation Act laid the groundwork and acted
as a catalyst for state implementation of legislation inhibiting the judicial
grant of protective orders.99 Florida is considered to be innovative in
enacting legislation that prohibits protective orders when doing so
conceals public hazards.100 Under its anti-secrecy legislation, Florida
The Florida “Sunshine in Litigation Act” provides, in part:
(3) Except pursuant to this section, no court shall enter an order or
judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public
hazard or any information concerning a public hazard, nor shall the
court enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of
concealing any information which may be useful to members of the
public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the
public hazard.
(4) Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or
effect of concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a
public hazard, or any information which may be useful to members of
the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from
the public hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be
enforced.
(5) Trade secrets as defined in s. 688.002 which are not pertinent to
public hazards shall be protected pursuant to chapter 688. . .
(7) Upon motion and good cause shown by a party attempting to
prevent disclosure of information or materials which have not
previously been disclosed, including but not limited to alleged trade
secrets, the court shall examine the disputed information or materials
in camera. If the court finds that the information or materials or
portions thereof consist of information concerning a public hazard or
information which may be useful to members of the public in
protecting themselves from injury which may result from a public
hazard, the court shall allow disclosure of the information or materials.
If allowing disclosure, the court shall allow disclosure of only that
portion of the information or materials necessary or useful to the
public regarding the public hazard. . .
FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2005). “Trade secrets” are separately defined as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process that: (a) Derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.
Id. at § 688.002. In December 2005, the Florida Court of Appeals affirmed the
constitutionality of the Florida “Sunshine in Litigation” law, holding that it is “rationally
related to a reasonable government objective.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jones et al.,
929 So. 2d 1081, 1086 (Fla. App. 2005).
100
NICK SULLIVAN, AUTOMOTIVE LITIG. REPORTER, FLA. APPEALS COURT UPHOLDS
‘SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION’ LAW (2005), http://news.findlaw.com/andrews/pl/aut/
99
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defines “public hazard” broadly, inhibiting protective orders if the
litigants’ confidentiality reduces public access to possible hazard
information.101 If trade secrets are potentially at risk in a public hazard
matter, the court provides a measure of confidentiality by disclosing
only the portion relevant to public safety.102 Whereas Florida has
attempted to protect public interest by prohibiting courts from entering
protective orders in cases of public importance, Texas attempted to
restrict confidentiality by establishing a rigorous balancing test.
In Texas, court records are presumed open and will only be sealed in
instances where a protective order is the least restrictive means of
adequately protecting the specific interest asserted.103 The party seeking
20051222/20051222tires.html. Florida is cited as a model for state implementation of
legislation that creates obstacles for the judicial issuance protective orders. Id. Senator
Kohl cited the Florida statute during his proposed federal version, indicating that “Florida,
for example, has in place a Sunshine in Litigation law that severely limits the ability of
parties to conceal information that effects [sic] public health and safety.” 149 CONG. REC.
S4964 (April 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
101
FLA. STAT. § 69.081(2) (2005). Under the auspices of the Florida sunshine law, public
hazards include any “instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument,
person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure, or
product that has caused or is likely to cause injury.” Id. By including such a broad list, the
statute appears to extend to every possible matter. However, it is limited in one crucial
way: in order to be a public hazard, it must have caused injury in the past and be likely to
do so again. Id.
102
Id. at § 69.081(5). Florida’s only explicit exception—trade secrets “which are not
pertinent to public hazards”—essentially protects very little in practice, as relation to a
public hazard is what triggers its application. Id. In Florida, in camera hearings balance
whether the trade secrets are potentially at stake and warrant protection. Id. at § 69.081.
Trade secrets include information that “derives independent economic value” from not be
generally known by the public. Id. at § 688.002.
103
Ashley Gauthier, Secret Settlements: Hiding Defects, Hurting the Public,” 24 NEWS MEDIA
& THE LAW 3 (FALL 2000). The Texas rule regarding sealing court records is, in part, as
follows:
1. Standard for Sealing Court Records. Court records may not be
removed from court files except as permitted by statute or rule. No
court order or opinion issued in the adjudication of a case may be
sealed. Other court records, as defined in this rule, are presumed to be
open to the general public and may be sealed only upon a showing of
all of the following:
(a) a specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs:
(1) this presumption of openness;
(2) any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general
public health or safety;
(b) no less restrictive means than sealing records will adequately and
effectively protect the specific interest asserted.
2. Court Records. For purposes of this rule, court record means. . .
(c) discovery, not filed of record, concerning matters that have a
probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety, or the
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confidentiality through a protective order has the burden of proving that
a “specific, serious and substantial interest” clearly outweighs (1) the
presumption of openness afforded by the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
76a, as well as (2) any probable adverse effect that sealing would have on
the general public health or safety.104 Texas’s presumption of openness
allows public access to un-filed settlements and discovery materials if a
probable adverse effect on public health or safety exists.105 Additionally,
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a allows third parties, including the
media, to intervene and challenge sealing orders.106 Texas courts,
however, have limited public access through the implementation and
administration of public office, or the operation of government, except
discovery in cases originally initiated to preserve bona fide trade
secrets or other intangible property rights.
3. Notice. Court records may be sealed only upon a party’s written
motion, which shall be open to public inspection. . .
4. Hearing. A hearing, open to the public, on a motion to seal court
records shall be held in open court as soon as practicable, but not less
than fourteen days after the motion is filed and notice is posted. Any
party may participate in the hearing. Non-parties may intervene as a
matter of right for the limited purpose of participating in the
proceedings. . . The court may inspect records in camera when
necessary. . .
6. Order on Motion to Seal Court Records. A motion relating to sealing
or unsealing court records shall be decided by written order, open to
the public, which shall state: the style and number of the case; the
specific reasons for finding and concluding whether the showing
required by paragraph 1 has been made; the specific portions of court
records which are to be sealed; and the time period for which the
sealed portions of the court records are to be sealed. . .
7. Continuing Jurisdiction. Any person may intervene as a matter of
right at any time before or after judgment to seal or unseal court
records. . . However, the burden of making the showing required by
paragraph 1 shall always be on the party seeking to seal records. . .
TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a (Vernon 2005).
104
BP Prods. N. Am., Inc. v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., NO. 01-05-01032-CV, 2006
Tex. App. LEXIS 4286 (Tex. App. May 18, 2006). On appeal, BP contended that witness
statements recounting the victims of an oil facility explosion are not court records and do
not meet the test set forth in TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a. Id. After applying Rule 76a’s two-part test,
the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
corporation’s motion to seal the witness statements. Id.
105
TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c) (Vernon 2005). See supra notes 102-03. “In 1990, the Texas
Supreme Court promulgated what is perhaps the most far-reaching court-written antisecrecy regulation in the nation, Sec. 76a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule
creates a ‘presumption of openness’ applying public access to all court records. Court
records include pretrial discovery documents.” NY STATE TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOC., SECRETS
KILL: WHY NEW YORK SHOULD ENACT THE SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT (May 2004).
106
TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a (Vernon 2005). Rule 76a even allows intervention after a final
judgment, giving the media an opportunity to examine past records if new significance is
discovered after-the-fact. Id.
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application of Rule 76a.107 One exception, trade secret information, is
afforded confidentiality through protective orders.108
Washington’s Public Right to Know Bill establishes a strong
presumption for public access to information in products liability and
hazardous waste cases.109 The Washington legislature, however, does

107
In re Bain, 144 S.W.3d 236 (Tex. App. 2004). Texas courts clearly recognize limits to
public access. Id. In a client’s malpractice suit against her lawyer, the judge abused his
discretion in ordering the disclosure of billing documents. Id. These documents were
subject to a proper confidentiality order under TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a, the client was not
authorized to receive the documents, and the client did not state how the information
related to any element of her cause of action. Id. Additionally, Texas maintains that
admissibility is, indeed, a prerequisite for unsealing documents. Id. See also Abdelnour v.
Mid Nat’l Holdings, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. App. 2006). Documents may be tendered in
camera for the purpose of obtaining a ruling on the admissibility of such documents. Id.
Due to the fact that such documents are not ‘court records,’ the documents do not need to
be given to the opposing party until the court rules on their admissibility. Id. Restraining
public access, evident in each of these examples, is a byproduct of Texas’ law regarding the
sealing of court records.
108
TEX. R. CIV P. 76a(2)(c) (Vernon 2005) (preserving “bona fide trade secrets”).
109
Washington’s version of the Sunshine in Litigation Act—the Public Right to Know
Bill—follows, in part:
(1)
(a) “Product liability/hazardous substance claim” means a
claim for damages for personal injury, wrongful death, or property
damage caused by a product or hazardous or toxic substances, that is
an alleged hazard to the public and that presents an alleged risk of
similar injury to other members of the public. (b) “Confidentiality
provision” means any terms in a court order or a private agreement
settling, concluding, or terminating a product liability/hazardous
substance claim, that limit the possession, disclosure, or dissemination
of information about an alleged hazard to the public, whether those
terms are integrated in the order or private agreement or written
separately. . .
(2)
Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, members
of the public have a right to information necessary for a lay member of
the public to understand the nature, source, and extent of the risk from
alleged hazards to the public.
(3)
Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, members
of the public have a right to the protection of trade secrets as defined in
RCW 19.108.010, other confidential research, development, or
commercial information concerning products or business methods.
(4)
(a) Nothing in this chapter shall limit the issuance of any
protective or discovery orders during the course of litigation pursuant
to court rules. (b) Confidentiality provisions may be entered into or
ordered or enforced by the court only if the court finds, based on the
evidence, that the confidentiality provision is in the public interest. In
determining the public interest, the court shall balance the right of the
public to information regarding the alleged risk to the public from the
product or substance as provided in subsection (2) of this section
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not limit protective orders, but instead only restricts private
confidentiality agreements.110
Accordingly, before enforcing a
confidentiality agreement, Washington requires the courts to weigh
public safety risks against privacy interests.111
Unlike Florida’s
provision, Washington’s law is not limited to hazards that have actually
caused injury, but instead applies to confidentiality agreements that limit
disclosure “about an alleged hazard to the public.”112 As a matter of
public policy in Washington, trade secrets and commercial information
are protected and unnecessary disclosure is to be prevented.113
Like the Washington law, Louisiana’s Sunshine in the Courtroom
Bill attempts to balance the competing interests of public access and
against the right of the public to protect the confidentiality of
information as provided in subsection (3) of this section.
(5)
(a) Any confidentiality provisions that are not adopted
consistent with the provisions of this section are voidable by the
court. . .
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611 (West 2005).
110
Id. at § 4.24.611(4)(a) (“Nothing in this chapter shall limit the issuance of any
protective or discovery orders during the course of litigation pursuant to court rules.”).
111
Id. at § 4.24.611(4)(b).
112
Id. at § 4.24.611(1)(b) (emphasis added). Confidentiality provisions, as defined by the
statute, include court orders that “limit the possession, disclosure, or dissemination of
information about an alleged hazard to the public, whether those terms are integrated in the
order or private agreement or written separately. . .” Id. (emphasis added).
113
Id. at § 4.24.601. Washington’s definition of “trade secrets” referred to in part (3) of
the aforementioned statute is as follows:
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.
Id. at § 19.108.010. Specifically, the Code articulates that:
The legislature finds that public health and safety is promoted when
the public has knowledge that enables members of the public to make
informed choices about risks to their health and safety. Therefore, the
legislature declares as a matter of public policy that the public has a
right to information necessary to protect members of the public from
harm caused by alleged hazards to the public. The legislature also
recognizes that protection of trade secrets, other confidential research,
development, or commercial information concerning products or
business methods promotes business activity and prevents unfair
competition. Therefore, the legislature declares it a matter of public
policy that the confidentiality of such information be protected and its
unnecessary disclosure be prevented.
Id. at § 4.24.601.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/9

Kutz: Rethinking the "Good Cause" Requirement: A New Federal Approach t

2007]

Rethinking the “Good Cause” Requirement

323

litigants’ confidentiality in matters relating to public hazards.114 The
Louisiana provision does provide exceptions to protect “trade secret”
and “commercial information,” terms which the statute itself does not
define.115 As a result, in matters involving public hazards, trade secret
information remains protected and, therefore, confidential under a
protective order.116

LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426 (2005). In part, Louisiana’s general provisions
governing discovery indicate that:
A. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court
in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including
one or more of the following:
(1) That the discovery not be had.
(2) That the discovery may be had only on specified terms. . .
(3) That the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery.
(4) That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
discovery be limited to certain matters.
(5) That discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court.
(6) That a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the
court.
(7) That a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated
way. . .
B. If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the
court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any
party or person provide or permit discovery. . .
Id. (emphasis added).
115
Id. The Louisiana provision addresses “commercial information” as follows:
C. No provision of this Article authorizes a court to issue a protective
order preventing or limiting discovery or ordering records sealed if the
information or material sought to be protected relates to a public
hazard. . . unless such information or material sought to be protected is a
trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information.
D. Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or
effect of concealing a public hazard, any information relating to a
public hazard. . . is null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to
public policy, unless such information is a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information.
Id. (emphasis added).
116
Save Our Selves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Com., 430 So. 2d 1114 (La.
App. 1983). In a hearing before the Louisiana Environmental Control Commission to
determine whether permits for hazardous waste disposal and water discharge should be
114
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The aforementioned state statutes maximize public access, especially
in matters involving public safety. By incorporating exceptions for trade
secrets and commercially-sensitive information, and thereby preserving
confidentiality in certain cases, however, they differ from the statute in
Arkansas.117
b.

State Statute that Requires Public Hazard Disclosure, but Does Not
Provide for a Trade Secret Exception: Arkansas

Unlike the preceding state statutes, the Arkansas statute fails to
protect trade secrets and reduces private litigants’ right to privacy
during discovery by prohibiting protective orders in matters regarding
environmental hazards.118 Under this statute, public access is maximized
as settlement agreements that conceal potential environmental or public
health hazards are automatically treated as void by reason of Arkansas’
public policy.119 Private contract provisions in Arkansas which restrict
disclosure of environmental hazards, for trade secret reasons or
otherwise, are void.
c.

Information-Sharing With Subsequent Litigants: Virginia

Virginia’s statute differs drastically from other states’ sunshine
legislation because it is based on the principle of information-sharing.120

issued, certain trade secret information—unnecessary to the Commission’s decision—was
protected by Louisiana’s trade secret exception to public access. Id.
117
See infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing Arkansas’ confidentiality statute, which does not
protect trade secrets).
118
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (Supp. 2005). The Arkansas statute titled “Contract
provisions restricting disclosure of environmental hazards are void,” indicates that:
(a) Any provision of a contract or agreement entered into to settle a
lawsuit which purports to restrict any person’s right to disclose the
existence or harmfulness of an environmental hazard is declared to be
against the public policy of the State of Arkansas and therefore void.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term “environmental hazard”
means a substance or condition that may affect land, air, or water in a
way that may cause harm to the property or person of someone other
than the contracting parties to a lawsuit settlement contract. . .
Id.
119
Id. at § 16-55-122(a). See also Chollet, supra note 18, at n.225.
120
Morrison, supra note 27, at 123. Virginia prohibits confidential settlements and gag
rules in wrongful death and personal injury cases, effectively freeing attorneys to discuss
relevant matters with future litigants. Id. Virginia law subscribes to the notion that there
are no justifications for forbidding one attorney to share documents produced under a
protective order with another attorney, as long as the second attorney abides by the
original protective order provisions. Id. The Virginia legislature “stepped in and decided
that certain kinds of disclosures are too important to be left to the lawyers and the
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Virginia’s protective order provision provides litigants with
confidentiality by limiting public access, but simultaneously removes
their ability to control future litigants’ access.121 The Virginia legislature
does not outline a process by which judges should grant protective
orders, but instead governs their scope once issued.122 In Virginia, as a
result of this law, attorneys can share information they receive under a
protective order with other attorneys involved in similar litigation.123
State statutory requirements regarding public access to discovery
materials attempt to govern confidentiality, but fail to sufficiently
establish a proper and thorough judicial approach to issue protective
orders. Additionally, by restricting confidentiality in discovery, the
sunshine in litigation statutes interfere with attorneys’ fiduciary duty to
act in their clients’ best interests.124

adversary process” and that “as long as the second lawyer is bound, the defendant gets all
the protection to which it is entitled.” Id.
121
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (2006). In Virginia, attorneys are not permitted to release
discovery information under a protective order to the public, but they are allowed to share
information with subsequent litigants. The Virginia statute limiting further disclosure of
discoverable materials is as follows:
A protective order issued to prevent disclosure of materials or
information related to a personal injury action or action for wrongful
death produced in discovery in any cause shall not prohibit an
attorney from voluntarily sharing such materials or information with
an attorney involved in a similar or related matter, with the permission
of the court, after notice and an opportunity to be heard to any party or
person protected by the protective order, and provided the attorney
who receives the material or information agrees, in writing, to be
bound by the terms of the protective order.
Id.
122
Id. Once a protective order is granted, this statute enables the judge to stretch or
diminish its scope without any restrictions. Id.
123
Morrison, supra note 27, at 123. Weaknesses exist in applying the Virginia
information-sharing protective order statute. The Virginia statute does not:
state whether the other plaintiff’s lawyer must have filed a lawsuit
already. It is not clear whether the law applies to other lawyers who
are either not members of the Virginia Bar or who have cases outside
of Virginia. It fails to make clear which court will enforce the
protective order against the second lawyer—the one issuing the
protective order, or the one where the second case is pending.
Id. at 122.
124
See supra Part II.C.2.
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Interfering with Attorneys’ Fiduciary Duty: Statutory Requirements
for Public Access Are Not in Accord with Attorneys’ Fiduciary Duty
Good counselors lack no clients.125

Sunshine statutes divide attorneys’ loyalty between their clients and
the public, which may be inconsistent with the notion of a fiduciary
duty. It is well-settled law that, regardless of jurisdiction, attorneys owe
their clients a fiduciary duty.126 The fiduciary duty binds attorneys to
represent their clients’ best interests.127 Among the fiduciary duties are
undivided loyalty, candor, and the ethical obligations of giving clients
full and meaningful disclosure of conflicts of interest so that the client
may decide if the representation is in his or her best interest.128 The
fiduciary duty that an attorney owes clients may not be dispensed with,
modified, or taken lightly.129 In some instances, protective orders may be
in accord with clients’ best interests. As a result, attorneys are bound to
advocate for maximum confidentiality.130
Statutes regulating
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE I, 2 (Signet 2005).
Akron Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 819 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ohio 2004). See also Huber v.
Taylor, 469 F.3d 67 (3d Cir. 2006) (comparing various jurisdictions’ approaches—including
Pennsylvania, Indiana and Texas—to enforcing and regulating breaches of attorneys’
fiduciary duty).
127
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2004). See Akron Bar Ass’n, 819 N.E.2d at
680 (“The attorney stands in a fiduciary relationship with the client and should exercise
professional judgment solely for the benefit of the client and free of compromising
influences and loyalties”) (internal quotation omitted); In re Tsoutsouris, 748 N.E.2d 856,
859 (Ind. 2001); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Monsour, 701 A.2d 556, 558 (Pa. 1997)
(“This public trust that an attorney owes his client is in the nature of a fiduciary
relationship involving the highest standards of professional conduct.”); Arce v. Burrow,
958 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1997).
128
Huber, 469 F.3d at 72. It is important to note, however, that the purpose of the
fiduciary duty is two dimensional: it is not just to protect clients, but instead “is also
designed to regulate the fiduciary and to ensure that the fiduciary performs his [or her]
duties.” Id. at 80. In fulfilling their fiduciary duties, attorneys must avoid conflicts of
interest, and must also not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.” Milgrub v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 03:05-332, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80, 13
(D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2007). See also Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1998).
129
Huber, 469 F.3d at 72. See, e.g., Milgrub, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 13 (clearly stating that
the fiduciary duty that an attorney owes clients is “among the most stringent to be found”);
Capital Care Corp. v. Hunt, 847 A.2d 75, 84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“It is axiomatic that an
attorney who undertakes representation of a client owes that client both a duty of
competent representation and the highest duty of honesty, fidelity, and confidentiality.”).
As Judge Cardozo observed in In the Matter of Rouss, “[m]embership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions.” In the Matter of Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917).
130
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2004). See infra Part III.B.2
(discussing the role of protective orders in discovery). As an advisor for her clients, a
lawyer is required to provide advice using her professional judgment, considering not just
the law, but also “moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
125
126
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confidentiality diminish attorneys’ ability to fully and effectively
advocate for their clients.
State approaches to confidentiality provide a roadmap, but not a
model, for a system of civil litigation that addresses privacy concerns
and permits access to the judicial system. State statutes vary in scope,
process, and on the issue of whether to protect trade secrets. Although
the aforementioned states have enacted provisions guiding state courts’
ability to provide confidentiality, the majority of states have not.131
Outlining the various approaches to which federal judges subscribe, and
to which states adhere, reveals the fact that a consistent method for
granting protective orders is non-existent.132
An established and clear method by which judges on the federal
level should grant protective orders remains undecided. Part III
analyzes the shortcomings of the Third Circuit’s balancing test, promotes
the notion that a broad array of factors must be considered in effectively
determining “good cause,” and also highlights the fact that inhibiting
protective orders circumvents attorneys’ fiduciary duty.

client’s situation.” MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2004). Considering the
most economically advantageous method of protecting discovery materials is consistent
with an attorney’s fiduciary duty. Id.
131
Tennessee, for example, refuses to enact legislation to establish standards for sealing
court records. See generally Chollet, supra note 18. The Tennessee Supreme Court flatly
rejected to Proposed Rule of Civil Procedure 1A which would have adopted procedural
obstacles and a new standard for sealing court records. Opponents of the Rule “expressed
concern over the Proposed Rule’s expansive scope, citing numerous potentially detrimental
effects of the proposed rule,” including but not limited to “a chilling effect on settlements,
unnecessary delay of litigation, and potential future disputes due to the vagueness in the
Proposed Rule as drafted.” Id. at 741-43. Due to the lack of “adequate procedural
safeguards for refining the broad scope of the Proposed Rule” it likely “would have done
more harm than good.” Id. Even proponents of the Proposed Rule, who argue that “public
notice is a social imperative” acknowledge that this “principle should be tempered to
provide a reasonable balance of the many competing interests between private litigants and
the public,” which this restriction on protective orders failed to provide. Id. at 745.
Because of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s attention to the privacy infringements of the
Proposed Rule, the trial court judge rightly maintains the discretion to issue protective
orders. The full text of the proposed Rule can be found at the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
website: TENN. SUP. CT. (2006), http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/opinions/tsc/rules/proposals/
2005/2005amd.pdf.
132
See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing judges’ approaches to granting protective orders);
supra Part II.C.2 (discussing state statutes that regulate confidentiality in discovery).
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III. ANALYSIS
One of the things we cherish most about being Americans is
our. . . privacy.
If we lose that. . . we will have lost something irreplaceable.133
As Part II illustrates, the extent to which F.R.C.P. 26(c) permits
judges to issue protective orders—and limit public access to discovery
materials—is unclear.134
While several federal courts and state
legislatures have attempted to develop tests, no uniform set of rules yet
exists for judges to consistently consult when determining “good cause”
under F.R.C.P. 26(c).135 Part III analyzes the tension that arises from
allowing judicial discretion to govern the issuance of protective orders
under F.R.C.P. 26(c), critiques the various judicially-created approaches
to ascertaining “good cause,” and analyzes how protective orders
comport with attorneys’ fiduciary duties.
Pansy chartered in new ground when it articulated specific criteria to
consider when ascertaining whether discovery warrants a protective
order.136 Nevertheless, Pansy’s “good cause” balancing test is now
archaic, undeveloped, and fails to account for the wide array of valid
grounds for protective orders.137
Clearly, Pansy laid important
groundwork in isolating “good cause” considerations, but it is flawed in
that it neither develops priorities for judges to consider nor accounts for
matters in which trade secrets are at risk.138 Additionally, Pansy’s
unclear approach ushers in public policy shortcomings, such as
undermining attorneys’ well-established fiduciary duty to serve their
clients’ best interests.139 Currently, on the federal level, there is not a
clear, methodical process to ascertain “good cause,” a prerequisite of
protective orders.140

Mark Hansen, No Place to Hide, 83 A.B.A. J. 44, 47 (Aug. 1997).
See supra Part II.B (discussing the various approaches that federal judges currently
follow to determine “good cause”).
135
See supra Part II.B (discussing federal circuits’ approaches); supra Part II.C (discussing
states’ efforts to define instances in which public access is necessary).
136
See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii (discussing the Pansy test specifically); supra note 71 and
accompanying text (discussing the seven narrow factors that Pansy outlines for judges to
consider).
137
See infra Part III.A.
138
See infra Part III.B.1.
139
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the effects of Pansy on attorneys’ fiduciary
capabilities).
140
See supra Part II.B.2.a (outlining the various approaches that federal judges currently
apply when considering whether “good cause” exists).
133
134
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A. The Third Circuit’s “Good Cause” Balancing Test:
Subsequent
Affirmation & Modification of Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg
Following Pansy, federal courts began to apply, and in some cases
modify, its specifically enunciated standards.141 For example, when
considering the validity of a protective order, the Third Circuit directly
applied Pansy and lifted a protective order because injury to the private
litigants did not arise from or exceed the public’s interest in access.142
Subsequent application of the “good cause” balancing test by the Third
Circuit not only affirms Pansy’s criteria, but also fundamentally broadens
its applicability to include discovery materials at-large, not just
confidential settlement agreements.143 Later modifications of the Pansy
standard also emphasize and prioritize the relevancy of the information
in question to determine if “good cause” exists.144
B. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg: Laying the Proper (But Not
Complete) Groundwork for Satisfying the “Good Cause” Requirement
Pansy enumerated criteria for judges to consider when determining
“good cause” and, in effect, established the skeleton of a balancing test
by holding that courts must weigh litigants’ confidentiality interests
against public access.145 It is necessary to add flesh to the Pansy
balancing test skeleton, because it lacks important and essential
considerations, including whether public access to trade secrets provides
unfair business advantages or disadvantages.146 Moreover, in order to be
in accord with the F.R.C.P. and attorneys’ fiduciary duty to their clients,

141
See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii (discussing the Pansy balancing test, and noting subsequent
implementation and modification of it).
142
See supra note 73 (discussing Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, a case which applies the
Pansy balancing test and clearly outlines each criteria in its consideration of a protective
order).
143
See supra note 72 (discussing Shingara v. Skiles, which clarifies and expands the Pansy
test to apply to discovery materials, as well as confidential settlements).
144
See supra note 71 (discussing Smith v. City of Chicago, which expands Pansy’s balancing
test to include consideration of the relevancy of the information that would be granted
confidentiality under a protective order).
145
See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s holding and
reasoning in Pansy); infra Part IV (explaining the proposed “Good Cause Doctrine,” a new
federal approach which would modify Pansy balancing test and provide flesh to the bones
of the Third Circuit’s approach); see also Shingara, 420 F.3d at 301 (citing Glenmede Trust Co.,
56 F.3d at 483; Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787-91.).
146
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing trade secrets as valid “good cause” under F.R.C.P.
26(c) and providing a sample of the circuits’ implementation of protective orders in trade
secret matters).
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additional considerations—particularly trade secrets—should be an
essential step in establishing whether “good cause” exists.147
1.

Pansy’s Limited Set of Factors Improperly Fails to Account for Trade
Secret Considerations When Determining “Good Cause”

The Pansy analysis is inadequate because it outlines incomplete
criteria for judges to consider when granting protective orders and does
not provide a process by which judges should prioritize or balance such
criteria.148 Trade secrets satisfy “good cause” to grant protective orders,
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(c), because confidentiality in these instances
preserves discovery information while shielding litigants from possible
business injuries or disadvantages.149
Trade secrets, a source of sufficient “good cause,” are overlooked in
the Pansy balancing test.150 When considering whether to grant a
protective order, courts should carefully guard the confidentiality of
trade secrets because imposing a business disadvantage on litigants as a
result of forced disclosure of trade secrets is antithetical to the discovery
process.151 A unique “genie in a bottle” dilemma arises when trade
147
See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of trade secrets on
attorneys’ fiduciary duty); infra Part IV (proposing the “Good Cause Doctrine,” an
approach that would prioritize trade secrets in determining whether discovery information
warrants confidentiality).
148
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the Pansy criteria, which are
listed generally, without an accompanying method or process).
149
See supra note 77 (discussing Essex Wire Corp., which satisfied “good cause” by
demonstrating that trade secrets were at risk. Although generally discoverable, this court
held that trade secrets warrant protective orders in order to prohibit disclosure of
confidential information).
150
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (trade secrets are overtly absent from the
Pansy “good cause” analysis); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing trade secrets as “good cause” for
protective orders, and providing examples of trade secret protection from among the
Circuits); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101
F.R.D. 34 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (emphasizing that, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(c), a court may order
that trade secrets, confidential research, or other commercial information produced during
discovery be protected from public disclosure); see also In re Papst Licensing, No. MDL
1298, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6374, 12 (E.D. La. May 4, 2000) (upholding a protective order
which required counsel having access to confidential information to refrain from advice in
patent prosecution for one year as “preparation and prosecution of patent applications . . .
is an intensely competitive decision making activity”).
151
See supra Part II.B.3 (noting that the importance of preserving trade secrets’
confidentiality is sufficient “good cause” to grant a protective order); supra Part II.A
(discussing the object and purpose of discovery); see also Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v.
Sundstrand Data Control, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D. Del 1988) (“Courts dress technical
information with a heavy cloak of judicial protection because of the threat of serious
economic injury to the discloser” of the information).
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secrets are at issue: once a judge allows trade secrets to be disclosed to
the public, the judge cannot restore secrecy and propriety, or put the
genie back into the bottle.152 If a court is uncertain as to whether or not
trade secret information will be adversely affected, the court should
grant a protective order as the possibility of inadvertently releasing
information through discovery is a serious concern which F.R.C.P. 26(c)
directly prohibits.153
By aligning with the stipulations of F.R.C.P. 26(c), the “good cause”
requirement is satisfied and justified when courts issue protective orders
to prevent the disclosure of trade secrets.154 A narrow construction of
“good cause” factors is not in accord with F.R.C.P. 26(c) because it
circumvents attorneys’ fiduciary duty by restricting the methods by
which attorneys can effectively advocate for their clients’ best interests.155
2.

Public Policy & the Practical Shortcomings of Pansy: Considering a
Narrow Set of Factors when Determining “Good Cause”
Circumvents Attorneys’ Fiduciary Duties

In order to comport with attorneys’ fiduciary duties and serve as an
effective guide for federal judges who are considering protective orders,
Pansy’s narrow list of factors must be broadened, clarified, and
prioritized.156 Protective orders that properly account for all “good
cause” considerations are in accord with attorneys’ fiduciary duties, as
they enable attorneys to represent their clients’ best interests and avoid
the lengthy and expensive alternative of designating confidential
documents throughout the discovery process.157

See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the unique and important confidentiality quality of
trade secrets, which F.R.C.P. 26(c) instructs federal judges to protect through protective
orders).
153
See AFP Advanced Food Prod. LLC, supra note 79, at 2 (noting that “inadvertent or
accidental disclosure may or may not be predictable,” but that to the extent that it can be
predicted, should be prevented through a protective order); see also Commissariat A
L’Energie Atomique v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 03-484-KAJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12782,
6-11 (D. Del. May 25, 2004) (emphasizing that when there is an unacceptable risk of
inadvertent disclosure or misuse of their highly confidential, a protective order should be
granted).
154
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the fact that F.R.C.P. 26(c) directly instructs courts to
protect trade secrets and commercially-sensitive information).
155
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing Pansy’s effects on attorneys’ fiduciary duties).
156
See infra Part III (highlighting the shortcomings and problems with the Third Circuit’s
Pansy test); supra Part IV (proposing a solution—the “Good Cause Doctrine”—which
accounts for trade secrets and comports with attorneys’ fiduciary duties).
157
See infra Part III.B.2 (noting how a narrow construction of “good cause” factors
circumvents attorneys’ fiduciary duty).
152
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It is necessary to establish a clear framework by which judges
ascertain “good cause” so that attorneys are able to determine from the
outset if a protective order is the most effective way to represent their
clients’ best interests.158 For practical reasons, limiting accessibility to
discovery materials through a protective order may be in the clients’ best
interests by yielding efficient proceedings, speedier resolutions, and
often higher-dollar settlements.159
To require an attorney to consider the interest of the public dilutes
attorneys’ loyalty to their clients and creates a conflict of interest when
none need exist.160 Because of the absence of a federal approach to grant
protective orders, some states undermine the F.R.C.P.’s protection of
trade secrets by implementing sunshine statutes.161 State sunshine
statutes diminish attorneys’ ability to act in their clients’ best interest by
statutorily tying judges’ hands, hindering protective orders, and
mandating public access without providing a judicial framework for
confidentiality.162 Imposing a statutory requirement for full public
access, particularly in complex litigation, would create an unnecessary
burden on attorneys’ fiduciary duty to serve their clients’ best interests
by increasing the cost and time frame of litigation.163
In addition to the logistical benefits of efficiency and speed, the
confidentiality that protective orders provide may be a necessary device
for attorneys to preserve clients’ underlying interests.164 For instance,
one such important underlying interest includes the confidentiality of

See supra Part IV (proposing the “Good Cause Doctrine,” a method by which attorneys
may process their information and, as a result, serve their clients’ best interests by
anticipating the viability of a protective order).
159
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the importance of protective orders as a tool for
attorneys to execute their fiduciary duty). See also In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820
F.2d at 357 (emphasizing the benefits of protective orders based on the fact that “busy
courts are simply unable to hold hearings every time someone wants to obtain judicial
review concerning the nature of a particular document”).
160
See supra Part II.C.3 (highlighting that attorneys represent their clients, not the public
at-large, and are bound to serve their clients’ best interests).
161
See supra Part II.C.2 (identifying and categorizing state statutes that regulate
confidentiality in discovery).
162
See supra Part II.C.2 (analyzing the effects of state “sunshine in litigation” statutes).
163
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing how statutory requirements for public access interfere
with attorneys’ fiduciary duty); supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the overwhelming benefits of
protective orders, specifically noting that of efficiency); see also In re Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d at 1326 (holding that protective orders are valid for the sake of
efficiency, as a document-by-document review “would slow discovery enormously”).
164
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing trade secrets, an underlying interest of clients, as valid
“good cause” for protective orders).
158
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trade secret information.165 Failure to account for a broad array of
important “good cause” considerations skews attorneys’ ability to
protect their clients’ confidential trade secret information.166 Protective
orders, and the confidentiality they provide, are key tools that attorneys
rely on to fulfill their fiduciary duty.167
Overall, the absence of a methodical process by which federal judges
ascertain “good cause” inhibits attorneys’ ability to determine the
optimal course of action for their clients, as it is impossible for attorneys
to predict whether a particular judge will view the discovery issue as
constituting “good cause.”168 Protective orders comport with attorneys’
fiduciary duty to their clients by enabling attorneys to represent their
clients’ best interests, increasing the efficiency of the litigation, and
diminishing the expenses.169 It is necessary, therefore, for federal judges
to clearly and overtly adopt a methodical process in which to consider
the broad range of criteria to ascertain “good cause” for granting
protective orders.170
IV. PROPOSING A NEW FEDERAL METHOD TO DETERMINE “GOOD CAUSE”
Existing rules and principles can give us our present location,
our bearings, our latitude and longitude. The inn that shelters
for the night is not the journey’s end. The law, like the
traveler,
must be ready for the morrow. It must have a principle of
growth.171
Although each federal circuit’s method to grant protective orders
partially excels, each method fails to offer a clear and workable process
for federal judges to approach “good cause.”172 Consequently, this Part
165
See supra Part II.B.3 (noting that F.R.C.P. 26(c) specifically protects trade secrets and
instructs judges to grant protective orders when they are at risk).
166
See supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting the breadth of attorneys’ fiduciary
duty).
167
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing how protective orders maximize efficiency and, often,
settlement amounts).
168
See infra Part IV (proposing a solution to the unclear and haphazard variety of federal
approaches judges currently utilize to determine “good cause”); supra note 71 and
accompanying text (discussing the Pansy criteria, which are not clear or prioritized).
169
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing how protective orders comport with attorneys’
fiduciary duty).
170
See infra Part IV (proposing a new approach to resolve Pansy’s shortcomings).
171
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 19-20 (1924).
172
See supra Part II.B (discussing the various approaches the Circuits utilize to determine
“good cause”); supra Part III.A (discussing how subsequent courts have modified and
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fuses the best aspects of each approach and generates a solution and
distinct guidelines for federal judges to follow when considering
whether “good cause” exists to grant a protective order per the
requirements of F.R.C.P. 26(c).173
Problems and shortcomings exist with federal judges’ interpretation
and application of F.R.C.P. 26(c)’s “good cause” requirement.174 The
absence of a consistent federal standard under which “good cause” is
determined results in unbridled judicial discretion and inconsistent
protective orders.175 This Part modifies the Third Circuit’s balancing test
by proposing significant additions to Pansy’s list of necessary
considerations and establishes the “Good Cause Doctrine” (“GCD”).176
The proposed GCD would effectively institute a new, methodical process
by which federal judges should determine “good cause.”177
The Pansy balancing test is inadequate.178 Currently, the factors
considered are too narrow, judicial discretion is unbridled, and the
granting of protective orders across and within the circuits is
inconsistent at best.179 Although Pansy articulates seven factors for
courts to balance when considering whether to grant a protective order,
the Third Circuit’s approach is too narrow, ineffective, and unclear.180
A. A Proper Fusion of the Current Tests: The Good Cause Doctrine
The proposed Good Cause Doctrine, which would apply to federal
courts, widens the factors that federal judges consider when determining
whether “good cause” is satisfied to warrant a protective order.181 This
expanded the Pansy criteria); supra Part III.B (highlighting Pansy’s failure to account for
trade secrets as “good cause” and discussing how Pansy’s narrow list of factors
circumvents attorneys’ fiduciary duty).
173
See infra Part IV.A (proposing the “Good Cause Doctrine”).
174
See supra Part III (analyzing the shortcomings with the current approach, or lack
thereof).
175
See supra Part II.B.2.a (noting the current variety of judicial approaches to granting
protective orders).
176
See infra Part IV.A. The name “Good Cause Doctrine” (“GCD”) and the factors of this
test were created solely by the author.
177
See infra Part IV.A (outlining a new, step-by-step method for judges to apply when
considering “good cause”).
178
See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the Pansy balancing test, the Third Circuit’s current
approach to ascertaining “good cause”).
179
See supra Part II.B (discussing the wide variety of current approaches to “good
cause”).
180
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 772. See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii (outlining the narrow list of Pansy
balancing test criteria).
181
See supra Part III.B (analyzing Pansy’s incomplete groundwork).
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new process, which merges the groundwork laid by Pansy with a
broader set of factors and a distinct process by which the factors are
considered, is in line with public policy and the overriding goals of the
F.R.C.P.182 Unlike the Third Circuit’s unclear balancing test, the
proposed GCD is a step-by-step process that provides consistent factors
for federal courts to consider, and instructs judges to methodically
consider them when ascertaining “good cause.”183
The proposed GCD would require the party requesting a protective
order to file a written motion with the adjudicating court. Additionally,
a copy of the motion would be simultaneously submitted to a circuitwide database that records confidentiality requests.184 The federal judge
would then consider the protective order motion by applying the
proposed GCD.
Under the proposed Good Cause Doctrine, the federal court judge
would first consider whether the information is being sought for a
proper or improper purpose.185 Improper purposes would include, but
not be limited to, inappropriate access to trade secrets, embarrassment of
the party, and idle gossip. If the information is sought for an improper
purpose, then the process is over and the court shall grant a protective
order.186
Next, if the information is being sought for a proper purpose—
including evaluating business history and dealings—the federal judge

See supra Part II.C.3 (noting how the absence of a consistent and method to determine
“good cause” interferes with attorneys’ fiduciary duties).
183
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s approach, the
Pansy test).
184
The purpose of the circuit-wide database is to record the frequency of confidentiality
requests. Also, it ensures that the public is able to seek out and be aware of possible
confidentiality. The discovery materials and information contained therein are not publicly
released until the judge determines whether a protective order is proper.
185
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. This portion of the proposed GCD directly
adopts the second Pansy criteria.
186
If a protective order is granted under any phase during the GCD analysis, the
protective order is binding on the parties. No privilege of information-sharing, as the
Virginia statute provides, exists under the GCD. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the
Virginia information-sharing statute). Instead, each subsequent litigant must discover his
own information and each request must individually undergo the GCD to determine
whether confidentiality is proper.
182
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would then consider whether trade secrets are at risk.187 Under the
proposed GCD, trade secrets would be defined as follows:
Commercially-sensitive information, including a formula,
pattern, practice, design, instrument, compilation of
information, program, device, method, technique, or
process that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to,
and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use;
(b) Where this benefit must derive specifically
from not being generally known, not just from
the value of the information itself; and
(c) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.188
If trade secrets are at risk, the federal court shall grant a protective order
to protect such information. The scope of protection may vary case-bycase, but protection of some form is clearly warranted.189
If trade secrets are not at risk, the federal judge would then ask
whether the case involves issues important to the public, such as public
health or safety.190 Under the framework of the proposed GCD, public
health or safety concerns would include the following:
Any device, instrument, person, procedure, product, or
condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure, or

187
See supra note 29 (providing the text of F.R.C.P. 26, which allows for protective orders
“upon good cause shown”); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing trade secrets as valid grounds for
“good cause”).
188
See supra note 99. The definition of trade secrets is based on the statutory language of
FLA. STAT. § 688.002 (2005). The italicized text is the author’s contribution.
189
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the three levels of trade secret confidentiality).
190
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Pansy’s factors, which include
both public health and safety concerns). This portion of the proposed GCD combines two
of the Pansy factors into one succinct question.
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product that has caused and is likely to cause injury to
the public in the future.191
If the information is not important to the public, according to the
aforementioned definition, then “good cause” is satisfied and a
protective order shall be granted.
In cases where the information is important to the public, the federal
court would proceed by asking whether sharing the information with the
public would promote fairness and efficiency.192 Efficiency is considered
in terms of both cost and time to the litigants. If public access would not
promote fairness and efficiency, then a protective order should be
granted. If sharing of information would promote fairness and
efficiency, then the court should not grant a protective order, and the
process is complete. By not requiring a particularized showing of
“harm” prior to granting or denying a protective order, the proposed
GCD would eliminate the vague and malleable “harm” component while
streamlining judicial discretion.
The protective order hearing would be considered to be severed
from the underlying case.
It would, therefore, be immediately
appealable, regardless of the judge’s decision.193 At this phase, any party
or non-party witness who participated in the preceding hearing would
be able to appeal.
B. Advantages of the Proposed Good Cause Doctrine
The Good Cause Doctrine provides for consistent and proper
determination of “good cause” in federal court. By clarifying and

191
See supra note 101. The definition of public health or safety concerns is based on the
statutory language of FLA. STAT. § 69.081(2) (2005). The italicized text is the author’s
contribution.
192
See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii (discussing the Pansy factors).
193
The interlocutory appeal feature of the proposed GCD is analogous to the recently
amended F.R.C.P. 23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (2006) (“A court of appeals may in its
discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class
action certification under this rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of
the order.”). F.R.C.P. 23 allows appellate review of district court decisions certifying or
refusing to certify class actions. Although opponents of appellate review criticize it as
inefficient, appellate control over district court discretion—in class action certification, as
well as the issuance of protective orders—performs the important function of reigning in
district court discretion and regularizing federal circuit decisions. See, e.g., In re Lorazepam
& Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 102-06 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Sumitomo Copper Litig.
v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 138-43 (2d Cir. 2001); Waste Mgmt. Holdings,
Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293-95 (1st Cir. 2000).
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prioritizing the Pansy criteria, the proposed GCD delineates the type of
discovery information that satisfies “good cause.” Its methodical process
and principles override undirected judicial discretion, account for a
variety of “good cause” forms, and also comport with public policy
interests. The GCD outlines a clear standard by which protective orders
may be granted and, as such, allows attorneys to argue proficiently for
their clients’ interests in litigation where a protective order is at issue.194
As a result, this clear process eliminates inconsistency in protective order
issuance and allows attorneys to heighten efficiency and determine from
the outset if a protective order is the most effective way of representing
their clients’ best interests.
There are many problems with the current Pansy balancing test.195
The proposed GCD model provides a mechanism that efficiently sorts
out the discovery information that warrants confidentiality from the
information that implicates public access. In the spirit of the F.R.C.P.’s
goals, as well as attorneys’ fiduciary duties, the Good Cause Doctrine
provides a clear and consistent process by which federal courts should
determine whether “good cause” exists.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the absence of a method to determine “good cause” under
F.R.C.P. 26(c) yields inconsistency and the disparate issuance of
protective orders among the circuits, while undermining attorneys’
fiduciary duties. Because F.R.C.P. 26(c) does not provide a framework
for judges to consult when granting protective orders, the approaches
and standards applied among and within the circuits vary. The Pansy
balancing test is undeveloped, fundamentally unstructured, and fails to
account for a wide array of “good cause” considerations. The proposed
Good Cause Doctrine is a new and unique method, which would resolve
Pansy’s void by developing a thorough, step-by-step approach for judges
to follow when determining “good cause.”
This framework is good news for Think Big Technologies from Part
I, who under the proposed GCD would likely be successful in shielding
their trade secrets under a protective order. The first step in securing a
protective order would be for Think Big Technologies to file a motion for
a protective order and to simultaneously submit a copy of the motion to
The proposed GCD is in sync with attorneys’ fiduciary duty. It provides attorneys
with a tangible process to consider and rely on when making decisions about the direction
of their clients’ litigation.
195
See supra Part II (analyzing the specific shortcomings of Pansy).
194
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the circuit-wide data base. Assuming this procedural requirement is
satisfied, the judge will proceed by applying the proposed GCD.
When applying the proposed GCD, the judge would first consider
whether the information is being sought for proper or improper
purposes. Here, Cokesi is seeking the information for the valid and
proper purpose of evaluating Think Big’s business history and dealings,
not the improper purpose of usurping trade secrets or embarrassing the
other party. Because the purpose is proper, the federal judge must
continue by applying step two of the proposed Good Cause Doctrine.
Next, the judge must consider whether trade secrets or other
commercially-sensitive information are at issue. Because Think Big’s
AMAX camera technology and film techniques are in fact trade secrets,
the judge will grant a protective order and any discovery materials
related to this information will remain confidential.196 The proposed
GCD concludes at this step, and a protective order is accordingly
granted.
Protective orders function to limit and shield sensitive discovery
information, “for good cause shown.”197 Currently, the process by which
protective orders are granted is unstructured and unclear. The absence
of a standard approach, which takes into account the broad range of
“good cause” varieties, interferes with attorneys’ fiduciary duty to serve
their clients’ best interests. Ultimately, the proposed Good Cause
Doctrine, a new federal approach to granting protective orders under
F.R.C.P. 26(c), strikes a balanced compromise and protects both
competing interests: public access and private litigants’ confidentiality.
Ashley A. Kutz198

At this phase, the judge will also consider the scope of the protective order. See supra
Part II.B.3 (discussing the three possible levels of trade secret confidentiality:
“confidential,” “attorneys and client representative(s)” confidentiality, and “attorneys’ eyes
only”).
197
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (2006).
198
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